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AMERICAN LABOR LAW AND LEGAL
FORMALISM: HOW "LEGAL LOGIC"
SHAPED AND VITIATED THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICAN WORKERS
ELLEN M. KELMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The late 19th century was a time of upheaval in labor rela-
tions in America, an upheaval which was reflected in, and which
ultimately reflected, changes in the legal principles governing the
treatment of labor conflicts in the courts. As a comparatively new
field of jurisprudence, labor law provided the perfect testing
ground for the flowering concept of legal formalism--a view of le-
gal theory that posits that law can be removed from politics by the
development of a body of fundamental axioms from which a com-
prehensive legal system can be generated by a simple logical
process.2
* A.B., Radcliffe, 1976; M.A., Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
1980; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1980.
1 See Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 251, 251-52 (1975);
see also K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 303 (1962) (for-
mal style of legal reasoning was dominant from approximately 1885 to 1910).
2Legal formalism is rooted in the concept of natural law. Pound, Liberty of Contract,
18 YALE L.J. 454, 465-68 (1909). Formalist reasoning relies on fairly specific legal rules es-
tablished by case law and legislative enactment. See Paine, Instrumentalism v. Formalism:
Dissolving the Dichotomy, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 997, 1007. The formalist model of judicial
decisionmaking often is equated with rule application, deductive thinking, and the grouping
of particulars into universal categories. Id. at 997. Critics of the formalist movement, how-
ever, refer to legal formalism as "mechanical" or "slot machine" jurisprudence, see, e.g., T.
BECKER, PoLrricAL BEHAVIORALTSM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 43 (1967); Pound, Mechani-
cal Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 605 passim (1908), because it incorporates the
notion that judges can "maximize" a number of conflicting goals through the formulation
and mechanical application of rules rather than by resort to a rational decisionmaking pro-
cess, see Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 358-59 (1973).
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On an abstract and highly simplified level, legal formalism en-
visions a complex and all-inclusive system of mutually exclusive
legal rights around which unambiguous and impermeable bounda-
ries may be drawn and within which the individual holding the su-
perior right has complete freedom of action.' While judges were
applying the logic of this concept in a variety of legal fields, they
faced problems posed by centuries-old glosses and qualifications
which had been placed on constructions of traditional rights.4
Thus, in the field that should have been paradigmatically capable
of formalist treatment-real property law, in which the settlement
of physical boundaries provided a metaphor for the formalist con-
struct-principles such as nuisance, dangerous uses, and prescrip-
tive easements rendered difficult an unambiguous statement of
rights."
The field of labor relations was different. With the increasing
frequency, importance, and violence of labor conflict subsequent to
the Civil War, courts were confronted with what amounted to an
almost entirely new field of law. Although there had been strikes
prior to the Civil War, they were less frequent and involved fewer
people than did those occurring in the latter part of the 19th cen-
tury. At the same time, the primary legal device used to deal with
the infrequent pre-Civil War strikes-criminal conspiracy indict-
ments-fell into judicial disfavor.6 The situation called for a neat,
8 See, e.g., Goodard v. Winchell, 86 Iowa 71, 85, 52 N.W. 1124, 1125 (1892) (finder of
lost property has a paramount right to possession as against everyone except true owner).
1 See, e.g., Marker v. Hanratty, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 217, 218, 97 A. 904, 904 (DeL Super.
Ct. 1916) (right to be free of unlawful bodily interference is qualified by right to defend
oneself); In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 262-63, 53 N.E. 1103, 1107 (1899) (right of share-
holder to inspect corporate books subject to qualification that inspection be sought at
proper time and for proper purpose).
5 See, e.g., Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YAZ L.J. 66,
69 n.8, 70 (1917) (difficulty in classifying legal principles in the field of real property law lies
in the nature of the property interests involved since such interests are composed of a com-
plex aggregate of rights, principles, and immunities). Formalist scholars did not consider
nuisance, dangerous uses, prescriptive easements, and similar principles as posing a substan-
tive challenge to the formalist model Rather, such principles were taken to represent a
simple refinement of the definition of property rights. Still, the existence of these qualifica-
tions made elegant formulations of the "absolute" rights of property difficult.
R. WKTsRA & E. STEvENs, LABOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 46 (1970). The pre-Civil
War courts generally followed the English common-law rule that combined action on the
part of organized laborers was an illegal conspiracy. Id. at 34. Under the conspiracy doc-
trine, any action by a labor union that affected an employer's business was illegal, even
where the act would have been legal had it been done by an individual Id. For a compre-
hensive account of the conspiracy trials, see J. COMMONS & J. ANDREws, PRInICPLES OF LA-
BOR LEGISLATON 101-12 (1916), and Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YAxE L.J. 825,
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definite, objective, and apolitical solution, and hence provided an
opportunity to prove the viability and worth of a system of formal
legal logic. If it could be shown that the complex and emotion-
laden issues arising in labor disputes could be pared to an exercise
in definition of rights, so that no lawful conflict could exist, it
would have given powerful support to the contention that the ef-
fort to reduce law to a comprehensive system of definitions and
rules of logic was both successful and useful. Complex common-law
qualifications of rights would have remained, but new impetus
would have been given to the effort to include such qualifications
in a harmonious system of rights.
The judiciary's attempt to create a rhetoric of neutrality,
couching labor decisions as applications of universal principles,
may also have served an independent political function.7 Indeed, it
is possible that a successful appearance of judicial neutrality in
rendering decisions that crippled working class organization in
some of its most effective manifestations could have been a valua-
825-28 (1926). However, as early as 1842, the Massachusetts courts rejected the conspiracy
analysis of strikes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 136 (1842); see
Witte, supra, at 827-28. In Hunt, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the mere formation of a union and the refusal to work for an employer who fired nonmem-
bers was not illegal. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 136.
After the Civil War, as increasing numbers of workers organized, labor conflict became
more pervasive and, on occasion, more violent. See P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR iN AmmucAN
HIS oRY 69 (1964). For example, during the Railway Strike of 1877, labor had its first clash
with the militia. R. WYKSTRA & E. STEVENS, supra, at 47. Also occurring in the late 19th
century was a strike that resulted in the closing of the Pennsylvania coal mines for more
than 6 months, see M. BEARD, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MovEMENT 82
(1920), and the rise of a secret society called the Molly Maguires, which allegedly was re-
sponsible for many violent riots in the anthracite coal regions, see P. TAFT, supra, at 73.
Violent strikes were not limited to Pennsylvania. There also were the Haymarket Riots in
Chicago, where more than 12 people were killed, and seven death sentences imposed. R.
WRSTRA & E. STEVENs, supra, at 47; see also S. ORTH, THE AIWIs OF LABOR 82 (1919)
(nearly 500 labor disputes occurred in first months of 1886); P. TAFT, supra, at 79-80 (dis-
putes with Erie Railroad caused strikes in New York); B. TAYLOR & F. WITNEY, LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW 26 (1983) (increased violence resulted from employer's practice of hiring
strikebreakers).
At the same time that labor conflict was becoming more acute in the 19th century, the
conspiracy doctrine was being applied with decreasing frequency. R. WWVsTRA & E. STE-
VENS, supra, at 45. In its place, courts began to employ an alternative means of controlling
strikes--the injunction. C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAw 30 (1979). See gener-
ally F. FRAuNuRTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 17-46 (1930) (exposition on the
early use of the injunction in labor disputes).
7 See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 105-06, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); see Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27
YALE L.J. 779, 783 (1918) (decisions to grant injunctions in labor cases result from policy
considerations rather than deductive reasoning).
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ble political tool for the conservative opponents of such organiza-
tions, who could claim that "the law" as enunciated applies equally
to all.8 How effective the attempts at neutrality were at serving the
political goal is beyond the scope of this Article. It is suggested,
however, that the repeated efforts by some courts to assert the
rights of workers in the abstract, while negating them in the par-
ticular, indicates that at least some judges were concerned not only
with their ultimate conclusions, but also with the political ramifi-
cations of their decisions.9 In addition, the readiness of subsequent
courts to accept the rules enunciated in these cases, even when re-
jecting their logic, indicates some success by the prior judges in
making their blatantly political decisions appear to be supported
by sound legal reasoning.10
The effort made in a variety of state courts to develop univer-
sal harmonizing principles for deciding labor cases ultimately
proved unsuccessful. As will be demonstrated, numerous courts
employed different methods in an attempt to develop the rules
from which legal decisions would follow."' These rules, however,
were undermined by one of two inherent flaws. Either the rules
degenerated into mere locutions which appeared on their face to be
statements of general decision rules, but which were unintelligible
except as statements of conclusion, or they were intelligible, but
only could be justified by reference to the same political goals that
legal formalism was intended to eliminate from judicial reasoning.
In formulating these rules, the courts developed a menu of
techniques for dealing with conflicts between rights and interests
a Anatole France's satiric comment on the economics of equality underscores the ab-
surdity of arguments that the law applies equally to all: "The law, in its majestic equality,
forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread." J. CouRNos, A MODERN PLUTARCH 27 (1928).
9 See, e.g., Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 308 Ill. 488, 496, 139
N.E. 887, 890 (1923) (conceding that the union had rights, but holding the employer's rights
superior).
10 See, e.g., Ossey v. Retail Clerks' Union, 326 Ill. 405, 416-17, 158 N.E. 162, 166 (1927);
Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, 99 Or. 1, 24, 192 P. 765, 772 (1920). In Ossey, the
Supreme Court of Illinois relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), and held that picket-
ing, when accompanied by threats, intimidation, or interference with the business of the
employer, was illegal. 326 Ill. at 416-17, 158 N.E. at 166. The American Steel Court relied in
part on an earlier Illinois case, in which the Illinois Supreme Court, after first making a
factual finding that the actions of the union were malicious, held that the union's picketing
activities were unlawful. See A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232
Ill. 424, 435-37, 83 N.E. 940, 944-45 (1908).
11 See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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that, as asserted, were irreconcilable. The menu appeared to con-
stitute a list of decisional rules, but in fact simply provided verbal
descriptions of predetermined results. Though the formulas re-
present different approaches to the same problem, each can be
viewed as a way in which courts unsuccessfully attempted to deal
with the central problem of the classical legal model-the develop-
ment of self-executing definitions of the rights of parties.
Described very broadly, there appear to have been three chief
categories of formulaic solutions to the problem of defining fully
complementary 12 and mutually exclusive rights. The simplest solu-
tion was for the court flatly to define the rights of one party to the
dispute and to couple that with an unarticulated assumption that
the rights of the opposing party were perfectly complementary. s A
second solution was to apply apparently factual standards which in
truth were circular definitions of legal conclusions. 4 The third, and
most complex, solution involved the court in a process of factually
distinguishing different kinds of labor activity. Such distinctions,
however, were of greater political import than they were of legal
significance. Having drawn the line, courts then proceeded to re-
tract from the political/legal analysis to now meaningless "factual"
findings. In other words, the third solution converged on the sec-
ond; what initially were real but legally indefensible factual dis-
tinctions became legal conclusions comprised of circular defini-
tions.15 Though each of these contrived formulas had a pure form,
which clearly was distinguishable from the other two, over the
years each formula tended to blend imperceptibly into the others.
The significance of examining the interplay of legal formalism
and labor law of the 19th and early 20th centuries lies in the fact
that the formulaic concepts that developed continue to be reflected
in much of labor law in 1983.11 The indefensible distinctions and
" The term "complementary" is used in this Article in a geometric sense-rights are
complementary if they cannot overlap, but together constitute a whole.
I" See, e.g., infra notes 87-124 and accompanying text; see also State v. Glidden, 55
Conn. 46, 72, 8 A. 890, 894 (1887) (since the rights of the employer and the worker cannot
coexist, the rights of the worker must yield); Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 405, 16 S.W. 111,
112 (1891) (although defendants may be acting in the lawful exercise of some distinct right,
they may be subject to a superior right).
14 See infra notes 134-96.
'" See infra notes 197-307 and accompanying text; see also Lehigh Structural Steel Co.
v. Atlantic Smelting & Ref. Works, 92 N.J. Eq. 131, 143, 111 A. 376, 381 (Ch. Ct. 1920)
(sympathy strike organized to establish a closed shop unlawful, since such a strike would
not directly benefit workers).
16 Treatment of the following issues is illustrative of the manifestation of legal formal-
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definitions that progressively were revealed to rest on inadequate
foundations from the 1870's through the 1940's have become re-
ified and accepted by modern labor law practitioners as standards
in their trade. For example, nearly 50 years after the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act1" supposedly marked a watershed for Ameri-
can trade unionism,18 unionized workers are still being victimized
by 19th-century judicial manipulations of the empty concept of
freedom of contract, by which the judiciary created extensive
rights in employers to the detriment of unions that desired to en-
gage in recognitional picketing."9 The rules that the 19th-century
judges created were political then, and are political now. Then,
they were falsely legitimized as "logic"; now they are legitimized as
"precedent. '20 Thus, the superstructure of rules remains, long after
ism in modern labor law- the distinction between primary and secondary activity, see, e.g.,
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490, 511 (1980) (union rules man-
dating that union labor handle containers on ships valid only if rules are designed to pre-
serve traditional longshoreman's work); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Lo-
cal Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 635 (1975) (agreement between union and general
contractors providing that subcontracting work only be given to firms that employ union
labor may be the basis of federal antitrust suit as potential restraint on competition); the ill-
defined bargaining position of supervisors who also are union members, see Florida Power &
Light Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 812 n.22 (1974)
(supervisors face "something of a dilemma," since choice to support either management or
labor is likely to appear disloyal to side not chosen); and the common treatment by arbitra-
tors of "management rights" clauses in collective-bargaining agreements as preserving man-
agement's common-law right to complete freedom of business operation, except as explicitly
limited by statute or contract, see, e.g., Cleveland Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, 51 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1174, 1181 (1969) (Dworkin, Arb.) ("[w]hen a collective bargaining agreement is en-
tered into, . . . managerial rights are given up only to the extent evidenced in the agree-
ment"); National Lead Co., 43 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1025, 1027-28 (1964) (Larkin, Arb.)
("[c]ompany does not have to bargain with the Union to get 'rights' which are inherent in
the management function; but it may relinquish certain of those rights in the course of
bargaining with the Union"). In each of these instances, the categories and logic of formal-
ism continue to dominate legal discussion.
27 Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)).
'8 See R. WYKSTRA & E. STFVsNS, supra note 6, at 109.
19 Recognitional picketing is designed to force an employer to bargain with a union with
which the employer has no current relationship. The concept of recagnitional picketing gen-
erally was not accepted at common law. See C. GREGORY, LABoR AND THE LAw 142 (2d rev.
ed. 1961). This lack of acceptance is "not surprising in view of the reluctance of most courts
to concede that peaceful picketing even by strikers was lawful." Id. Congress, apparently
influenced by the common-law rule, enacted limitations on recognitional picketing. See In-
ternational Hod Carriers Bldg. & Common Laborers Union Local 840, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153,
1156-58 (1962). See generally Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a
Seesaw, 30 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 78, 79-82 (1962) (discussion of Legislature's intent in enacting
ban on recognitional picketing).
20 See Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467, 470-74 (3d Cir.
1978) (tracing development of national labor policy).
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their so-called "logical" foundations have been weathered away.
This Article suggests that, at a minimum, modern labor law
should be reexamined in light of its tainted origins. The Article
will trace the application of legal formalistic thought to labor law
from the 1870's through the 1940's, focusing on the labor law of
Massachusetts and Illinois, since both states were fairly industrial-
ized by the late 19th century, and each had an active labor move-
ment that generated a substantial amount of legal activity.2 1 Be-
yond that, the Massachusetts court, and in particular Justice
Holmes, who had a special interest in labor matters, was an almost
inevitable choice, whereas Illinois presented an interesting contrast
precisely because of its lack of legal luminaries.
There are two writers whose works are instrumental to the
analysis of this Article-Oliver Wendell Holmes and Wesley
Hohfeld. The brooding omnipresence of Holmes looms over any
discussion of American legal developments in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. 22 Holmes turned his guns on contemporary
thought to the field of labor law in an article entitled Privilege,
Malice, and Intent, 3 and in a noteworthy dissent in Vegelahn v.
Guntner,4 incisively exposing the illogic of its underpinnings. In
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, Holmes contended that while the
question of what kind of economically damaging behavior should
be privileged is an issue to be addressed by the legislature, it nev-
ertheless is an inquiry into which courts sometimes stray of neces-
sity, yet fail both to acknowledge the political motivations involved
and to subject the questions to rigorous analysis. Justice Holmes
remarked:
But whether, and how far, a privilege shall be allowed is a
21 See, e.g., A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 Ill. 424,
431-35, 83 N.E. 940, 943-45 (1908); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 503-04, 57 N.E. 1011,
1015 (1900); Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 121-22, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (1891).
" See D. BURTON, OLrVR WENnELL HOLMES, JR. 76-82 (1980). A number of cases in-
volving labor-management conflicts occurred while Holmes was serving on the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts. Justice Holmes usually dissented in these cases. See, e.g.,
Plant, 176 Mass. at 504, 57 N.E. at 1015 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting); Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at
104, 44 N.E. at 1079 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, the only majority opinion in which
Justice Holmes took part was one that he authored. See Ryalls v. Mechanics' Mills, 150
Mass. 190, 22 N.E. 766 (1889). In Ryalls, Holmes construed the employers' liability act to be
an expansion of an employer's common-law liability rather than a limitation on an em-
ployee's right to recover. Id. at 195-96, 22 N.E. at 767-68.
:3 Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HRv. L. REv. 1 (1894).
4 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Is See D. BURTON, supra note 22, at 85.
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question of policy. Questions of policy are legislative questions,
and judges are shy of reasoning from such grounds. Therefore,
decisions for or against the privilege, which really can stand only
upon such grounds, often are presented as hollow deductions
from empty general propositions like sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas, which teaches nothing but a benevolent yearning, or
else are put as if they themselves embodied a postulate of the law
and admitted of no further deduction, as when it is said that, al-
though there is temporal damage, there is no wrong; whereas, the
very thing to be found out is whether there is a wrong or not, and
if not, why not.26
In his forays into labor law, Holmes was only making particu-
lar the general theme of much of his work during the period-that
policy decisions play a major role in the development of law, and
that judges and lawyers therefore should stop concealing their pol-
icy arguments and decisions behind a facade of politically-neutral
formal logic. 27
Holmes' treatment of labor law marked a major step away
from the self-imposed blindness of the truly formal analysis of the
conflict of rights in labor relations. Widely read, quoted, and re-
nounced, both Privilege and Vegelahn form the backdrop against
which much of this Article must be viewed.
Wesley Hohfeld's major work, Some Fundamental Legal Con-
Holmes, supra note 23, at 3.
27 Justice Holmes remarked:
In England, it is lawful for merchants to combine to offer unprofitably low rates
and a rebate to shippers for the purpose of preventing the plaintiff from becoming
a competitor, as he has a right to do.. . . But it seems to be unlawful for the
officer of a trade union to order the members not to work for a man if he supplies
goods to the plaintiff, for the purpose of forcing the plaintiff to abstain from doing
what he has a right to do.
... It might be said that the [union] defendants were free not to contract,
but that they had no right to advise or persuade the contractors who would have
dealt with the plaintiff not to do so, and that, by communicating the union's will-
ingness to deal with the contractors, if they would not deal with the plaintiff, the
defendants were using such persuasion. But if this refinement is not a roundabout
denial of the freedom not to contract,.., the same mode of reasoning could be
used in the cases where the defendant escapes. The ground of decision really
comes down to a proposition of policy of rather a delicate nature concerning the
merit of the particular benefit to themselves intended by the defendants, and sug-
gests a doubt whether judges with different economic sympathies might not decide
such a case differently when brought face to face with the issue.
Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted); see J. HurRsT, JusTIcE HOLMES ON LEGAL HisTORY 94-101
(1964).
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ceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,8 was written some
years after Privilege and Vegelahn, at a time when sociological ju-
risprudence was in full swing. Hohfeld's work has been viewed as
an example of systemization run riot.29 Although he was a partici-
pant in the liberal attack on legal formalism, Hohfeld was not con-
tent simply to write about the functions of law and the necessity
for a "sociological jurisprudence." Rather, he was interested in
showing that the legal logicians were unsuccessful on their own
terms-logic-and in providing an alternative logical structure
that could be used as the basis for a new, more rational jurispru-
dence.30 His basic insight can be exemplified in a chart, which ex-
presses his conception of logical relations in the law:
Jural right privilege power immunity
opposites no-right duty disability liability
Jural right privilege power immunity
correlatives duty no-right liability disability 1
Hohfeld's work is, to some extent, a period piece, but it re-
mains a useful way of organizing legal conclusions.3 2 More impor-
tantly, it provides a useful method of examining cases written in a
formal mode precisely because it is written in similar terms and
reflects much the same concern for system, rules, and logic.
Hohfeld's work provides a standard against which formalism prop-
erly can be judged."
" Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
2 Cf. Husik, Hohfeld's Jurisprudence, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 263, 273-74 (1924) (Hohfeld's
terminology not helpful in the practical solution of legal problems).
3o See, e.g., Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 59. In one subsection, Hohfeld criticizes the
assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to "rights" and "duties," and that simple
categories are sufficient to analyze even the most complex legal issues. Id. at 28-58. He pri-
marily was concerned with the importance of precise usage of such terms in judicial deci-
sions. See id. at 30-31.
31 Id. at 30..Jura correlatives describe the relative position of different parties. Thus, if
A has a right, some B or every B has a duty. Jural opposites describe opposite experiences or
positions of a single party. If A has a right, some B or every B has a "no-right" in relation to
A. Hohfeld refers to eight concepts-rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and
liabilities, immunities and disabilities-as "the lowest common denominators of the law."
Id. at 58.
" Hohfeld's categories have been used in the definitional sections of the Restatement
of the Law of Contracts and the Restatement of the Law of Property. See REsTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 1-10 (1936); Introduction to RSTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS at xiii (1932).
33 Another work that greatly influenced this Article is Walter Wheeler Cook's Privileges
of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life. See Cook, supra note 7, at 779. Cook's work
1983]
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RIGHTS VS. No-RIGHTS
The establishment of physical boundaries between parcels of
land previously was used as a metaphor for a formalist conception
of legal rights." The image is of a system of mutually-exclusive
rights that can no more "conflict" than can tracts of land sepa-
rated by clearly marked fences. People may stray onto other peo-
ple's rights as they may onto their neighbor's property, but either
act clearly would be a legal wrong. Each of the argumentative tech-
niques discussed in this Article can be viewed as an attempt to
operationalize this construct, to supply the workings for the com-
plicated machinery of social interaction under a regime of self-con-
tained rights.
The cases in this section illustrate two ways in which the
courts avoided acknowledging even the possibility that conflicting
interests might create conflicts between "rights." The first is the
pervasive confusion of Hohfeldian "privileges" and "rights." The
distinction between privileges, actions that a party legally may
take, and rights, actions that give rise to a positive duty on the
part of another, should have been central to a formal analysis.
Judges, however, repeatedly progressed from stating a party's priv-
ilege, for example, the privilege to do business, to concluding that
the very existence of that privilege gave rise to a correlative duty,
such as the "duty not to picket" a business.3s
provides an extremely effective example of how labor cases can be analyzed from both a
political and a logical viewpoint in terms similar to those employed in this Article.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 33. Noting the broad, indiscriminate use of the words
"right" and "privilege" in judicial opinions, Hohfeld reasoned that such ambiguity of termi-
nology impeded a clear understanding of legal relations and hindered the expeditious solu-
tion of legal conflicts. Id. In order to eliminate these obstructions, the meanings and appli-
cations of the terms "right," one's affirmative claim against another, and "privilege," one's
freedom from the right or claim of another, must be separated and refined. Id. As a means
of achieving this terminological reform, Hohfeld urged recognition of the correlatives and
opposites of the two terms. Id. at 30-33; see supra text accompanying note 31. A right,
Hohfeld contended, is the opposite of a "no-right" and the correlative of a "duty," while a
privilege is the opposite of a "duty" and the correlative of a "no-right." Hohfeld, supra note
28, at 30. To demonstrate the significance of the distinction between the terms "privilege"
and "freedom," Hohfeld offered the following illustration:
Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that
he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such
contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as
a consequence, fundamentally different from the relation between X and A. As
regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad; but as regards either A or any of
the others, X has such a privilege.
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The second means of ignoring conflicting potential rights was
to ignore the claims of the losing party, which usually was the
union. The court typically began by defining the employer's
"rights," often confusing them with privileges, and then treating
the outcome as determined by that single definition, paying no
heed to the claim of the losing party that it also had interests that
gave it rights, privileges, or immunities. As a means of analysis,
this had the advantage of allowing the courts to avoid considering
the fact that the claimed rights of each party often were incompat-
ible, yet equally plausible if analyzed in isolation. For example, a
court examining the right of an employer to hire freely in the mar-
ketplace, and a union's correlative duty not to disseminate infor-
mation regarding an ongoing dispute between it and the employer,
could ignore the conflicting right of potential employees to be
aware of such a dispute and an employer's correlative duty not to
interfere with the dissemination of information, or even a duty on
the employer to inform scabs that they were being hired as such.
Moving with excessive ease from a Hohfeldian privilege to a
Hohfeldian right, and then concluding the analysis, effectively ex-
cused the courts from dealing with the problem of incompatible
legal relationships.
The courts did not, however, always attempt simply to disre-
gard potentially conflicting rights. At times they addressed poten-
tial conflicts in a more straightforward manner by defining them
away. They accomplished this either by redefining the rights of the
winning party or by relegating the rights of the losing party to
some lower status, such as a "privilege," an "interest," or the like.
Sometimes this was a matter simply of employing adjectives-the
winner's rights were "absolute," "fundamental," or "constitu-
tional." At other times, the technique had a more substantive ap-
pearance, as the courts attempted to hone the definition of the
winner's rights, rather than simply to use new adjectives to de-
scribe them. Thus, at different times the rights of employers were
described in terms of the right to a free flow of labor, the right to
employ workmen in business or service, the right to make reasona-
ble contracts, and more. In any case, the loser was likely to be de-
scribed as having something other than, and of less importance
Id. at 35-36. In effect, with respect to A, X is under no duty to eat the salad, and A has no
right to force him to do so. On the other hand, Y's right to prevent X from eating the salad
gives rise to X's duty not to eat it and takes away X's right to eat it. Id.
1983]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1
than, a "right."
Winners and Losers in Massachusetts: Rights and Privileges of
the Parties
In 1870, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts first ad-
dressed the concept of conflicting legal relationships in the labor
context. In Carew v. Rutherford,6 an employer was fined by a
union for allegedly violating the union's bylaws. 7 The employer
sued the union in tort and for restitution of the fine."' In holding
for the employer, the court observed that "[e]very man has a right
to determine what branch of business he will pursue, and to make
his own contracts with whom he pleases and on the best terms he
can." ' This statement illustrates the first technique described
above. The employer's "right to determine what branch of business
he will pursue" is a classic Hohfeldian privilege.40 In creating a
s 106 Mass. 1 (1870).
Id. at 9. The employer in Carew had contracted to provide cut stone to builders in
the Boston area. Id. at 8. Most of the work force belonged to the Journeymen Freestone
Cutters' Association of Boston (the Association). Id. The bylaws of the Association provided
that the "association will not allow any ornamental work of any kind to be taken from one
yard to another, or any other place, to be cut or finished.. . ." Id. at 6 n.* (art. 24). Carew
nevertheless sent stone to New York to be finished, id. at 9, and, as a result, the Association
voted to fine Carew $500 for violating the bylaws, id. at 8. When Carew refused to pay, 12
stonecutters went on strike. Id. at 9. In order to fulfill his contract, Carew was forced to pay
the fine. Id.
" Id. at 8. In the tort count, Carew alleged that the Association, by "conspiring and
confederating together," had extorted the money from him. Id.
10 Id. at 14. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the relief was granted to
remedy the tort of "disturbing a man in the exercise of his rights and privileges, or to re-
cover back money tortiously obtained." Id. at 13. The court noted, however, that although
"[f]reedom is the policy of this country," id. at 15, no one has a right to band together to
"disturb or annoy" others, id. Thus, the court concluded that the union's practices "would
tend to establish a tyranny of irresponsible persons over labor" and therefore were illegal.Id.
4 See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 33. See generally Corbin, Legal Analysis and Termi-
nology, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 471, 476-80 (J. Hall ed. 1938) (formal definitions of
Hohfeldian concepts) (revised reprint of Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE
L.J. 163 (1919)) [hereinafter cited as Legal Analysis].
Using "right" in the generic sense, see Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 31 & n.29, it has been
stated that "a person living under our Constitution has the right to adopt and follow such
lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit," People v. Gill-
son, 109 N.Y. 389, 398, 17 N.E. 343, 345 (1888) (emphasis added). This generic right, or
Hohfeldian privilege, is "subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare." 109 N.Y. at 398-99, 17 N.E. at 345; see also Holmes, supra note 23, at 3 (question
of how far a privilege should be extended is a policy question). Thus, Justice Holmes ob-
served that "a man has a right to set up a shop in a small village which can support but one
of the kind, although he expects and intends to ruin a deserving widow who is established
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right for the employer, the court recognized a duty on the part of
the union not to interfere in any way with the employer's business.
Courts, however, were not ready to recognize a general duty of
noninterference with the employer's privilege. 41 Indeed, the Carew
court noted that people have the right "to associate themselves to-
gether and agree that they will not work for or deal with certain
men or classes of men, or work under a certain price, or without
certain conditions. 4 2 At most, the "right" asserted in Carew was a
limited one, giving rise to a very narrowly defined duty, and hardly
could bear the burden of mandating, as if by logical necessity, that
the union had a duty not to enforce its bylaws.43 Indeed, under
Hohfeld's scheme a right and a duty must be defined together;"
stating a "right" without recognizing that it exists only in relation
to duties was certain to create a situation like that in Carew, in
which there was, in fact, no logical connection between the enunci-
ated right and the holding derived from it. 45
The following year, in Walker v. Cronin,'e the Massachusetts
court held that a union could be liable in tort for inducing union
members to leave the employer when he refused to contract with
the union.47 By acknowledging that the employer had no right to
there already." Holmes, supra note 23, at 3. The impetus for this privilege "rests on the
economic postulate that free competition is worth more to society than it costs." Id.
41 See, e.g., Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499, 503-04 (1867). In Bowen, the
Massachusetts court held that a union, as long as it did not act in an illegal manner, may
form and compete, even if the resulting competition is destructive to existing business. Id.
at 502-03. Justice Holmes' example of the shopkeeper's rights, see Holmes, supra note 23, at
3; supra note 40, illustrated why the court may have been reluctant to declare a broad right
to do business, since that "right" was, at a minimum, limited by the identical right of busi-
ness competitors.
,2 Carew, 106 Mass. at 14.
43 Cf. Holmes, supra note 23, at 3-4 (discussing rights and privileges of employers).
" See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 30-32.
45 See id. at 31 ("even those who use the word and the conception 'right' in the
broadest possible way are accustomed to thinking of 'duty' as the invariable correlative").
To the extent that the Association's rules might be analogized to an effort to establish an
exclusive relationship between Carew and the Association, it is worth noting that contracts
for exclusive dealing were enforceable in other contexts. See, e.g., Carter-Crume Co. v. Peur-
rung, 86 F. 439, 442 (6th Cir. 1898) (contract with independent manufacturer for its entire
output not an illegal restraint of trade); New York Trap Rock Co. v. Brown, 61 N.J.L. 536,
536, 43 A. 100, 100-01 (1898) (per curiam) (contract for exclusive sales agency is valid); see
Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457, 464, 41 N.E. 683, 685-86 (1895) (contract restricting pur-
chaser of certain electrotype plates from selling plates or reproducing them is valid restraint
of trade, given nature of property, although contract effectively creates copyright on mate-
rial that could not be copyrighted under statute).
,0 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
47 Id. at 567-68. The defendants in Walker allegedly were interfering with the plaintiff's
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compel the employees to continue working for him, the court un-
covered the troublesome problem that the plaintiff had no more
than a privilege to employ the workers. 48 The court, however,
avoided the dilemma by concluding that the union did not have a
right to dissuade workers from contracting with the em-
ployer-which under Hohfeld's scheme does correlate with privi-
lege4 9 -and distinguished Walker from the case in which a defend-
ant interferes with another's business to protect its own legal
rights, such as the "right" to competition. In essence, the court
concluded that the union's "no-right" to interfere with the em-
ployer's privilege rendered the union's actions illegal. Rather than
formulating its conclusion by applying this logic, however, the
court used the following analogy to describe the interest of an em-
ployer in being protected from union action:
One may dig upon his own land for water, .. although he
thereby cuts off the supply of water from his neighbor's well....
But the rights of the owner of land being absolute therein, and
the adjoining proprietor having no legal right to such a supply of
water from lands of another, the superior right must prevail.51
The court concluded that "[e]very one has a right to enjoy the
fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and
credit. He has no right to be protected against competition; but he
has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, dis-
turbance or annoyance. ' 52
Both conflict-resolution techniques were at work in Walker.
The right to employ people initially is acknowledged as a privilege
that is limited by the privileges of competitors, as is the "right to
enjoy the fruits and advantages of [one's] own enterprise, industry,
shoe and boot business by inducing and coercing the plaintiff's employees to refuse to work
or to work negligently. Id. at 562.
"' Id. at 563-64. Under Hohfeldian analysis, if the employer had a right to employ
workers, there would be a corresponding duty in someone to be his employee. See Hohfeld,
supra note 28, at 28-32.
49 See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 30; supra note 35.
5 107 Mass. at 564. The court observed that "every one has an equal right to employ
workmen in his business or service; and if, by the exercise of this right in such manner as he
may see fit, persons are induced to leave their employment elsewhere, no wrong is done to
him whose employment they leave, unless a contract exists ..... Id. at 563.
51 Id. at 564 (citing Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117, 121-22 (1836)). Green-
leaf is the first case in the United States to hold that an owner of land has an absolute right,
rather than merely a superior right, as to his neighbor in the use of his own land. Frazier v.
Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 305 (1861).
52 107 Mass. at 564.
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skill and credit. '53 Using the water rights analogy, however, the
court determined that the union, like an adjacent landowner, had a
duty of noninterference." Thus, the court found that with respect
to the union, the employer had a right, not a privilege.55 At the
same time, the union's plausible right to bargain with an employer
that employs union workers and the employer's asserted duty to
bargain with the union and respect a contract so negotiated was
not explicitly rejected by the court; it simply was lost to view. The
court thus started with a plaintiff's privilege, analogized the de-
fendant to other parties that owed a duty, and then generated a
new plaintiff's right out of the defendant's analogized duty. It ac-
complished this in part by introducing a conclusory finding of mal-
ice on the part of the union, although the reported decision does
not indicate any evidence of malice as a factual matter. In fact, the
union's malice apparently consisted simply of interfering with the
employer's "right."5' 6
The problem of conflicting rights was neatly avoided in Com-
monwealth v. Perry.5 7 The Perry court struck down as unconstitu-
tional a statute forbidding employers of weavers to fine or to with-
hold wages because of imperfections in the finished cloth,5 noting:
There are certain fundamental rights of every citizen which are
53See id.
" See id. The Walker court asserted that the employer's right to labor is a "superior"
right, much like the right of a landowner to use his property as he wishes. See id. An adja-
cent landowner has a right to use his own property, but cannot interfere with the superior
right of a neighbor to use his property. Id. A labor union, according to the Walker court, is
similar to the adjacent landowner; although the union has rights, it cannot interfere with the
superior rights of the employer. See id.
" See id.
" See id. at 562.
57 155 Mass. 117, 28 N.E. 1126 (1891).
Id. at 121-22, 28 N.E. at 1127. The statute at issue in Perry prohibited employers
from refusing to pay employee-weavers who damaged cloth by "negligence or want of skill."
Id. at 120, 28 N.E. at 1126. The court found that to compel an employer to pay for "inferior
work" would violate the contract clause of the Constitution, id. at 121, 28 N.E. at 1126-27,
which "provides, among other things, that no state shall pass 'any law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts,"' id. at 121, 28 N.E. at 1127 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1). Thus
the employer was deemed to possess a constitutional right to employ and to contract with
employees of his choice. 155 Mass. at 121-22, 28 N.E. at 1127.
In his dissent, Justice Holmes contended that the statute should be upheld, noting that
"the legislature could deprive the employers of an honest tool which they were using for a
dishonest purpose ... ." Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes reasoned that the
statute must have been based on a legislative determination that weavers "often were cheat-
ed out of a part of their wages under a false pretense," and he was unwilling to substitute
the judgment of the court for that of the legislature. Id.
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recognized in the organic law of all our free American states. A
statute which violates any of these rights is unconstitutional and
void .... The right to acquire, possess, and protect property in-
cludes the right to make reasonable contracts, which shall be
under the protection of the law.... The right to employ weav-
ers, and to make proper contracts with them, is therefore pro-
tected by our constitution .... If [the statute] be held to forbid
the making of such contracts, . . . it is an interference with the
right to make reasonable and proper contracts in conducting a
legitimate business, which the constitution guarantees to every
one .... 59
In Perry, the employer's Hohfeldian "right" is inferred from
the existence of a constitutional immunity against government in-
terference.60 This miscategorization, however, is not as significant
as the court's ignoring the interests of the losing parties. In both
Carew and Walker, at least, the workers were discussed by the
court. 1 In Perry, however, the weavers and any rights which they
might have had played no part in the court's decision. The "funda-
mental right" to make "reasonable and proper" contracts that are
"protected by our constitution" actually defined the no-rights of
the weavers.62 Had the weavers' interest in being paid been consid-
:0 155 Mass. at 121-22, 28 N.E. at 1126-27.
0 See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 55-58. According to Hohfeld, "an immunity is one's
freedom from the legal power or 'control' of another as regards some legal relation." Id. at
55. In Perry, therefore, the court, in asserting that an employer could refuse to pay an em-
ployee for inferior work, assumed the existence of an immunity, not a right. See 155 Mass.
at 121-22, 28 N.E. at 1126-27; Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 55-58. If the employer's absence of
obligation was viewed as a Hohfeldian right of nonpayment, a correlative duty on the part of
the employee necessarily would exist. Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 31. Yet the employee's
inability to collect payment cannot properly be described as a duty; instead, it may be said
that the employee was under a disability, the correlative of immunity. See id. at 55; Goble,
A Redefinition of Basic Legal Terms, 35 COLUM. L. Rav. 535, 537-38 (1935).
11 In Carew, the court stated that employees had rights concurrent with those of em-
ployers. See 106 Mass. at 14-15. The rights enumerated in Carew included the right to de-
termine one's occupation, the right to contract freely with others or to refuse to contract
with any person or class of persons to further one's own advantage, the right to form as-
sociations to insist on certain wages and conditions, and the right to refuse to work for
certain persons or classes of persons. Id. at 14. The Walker court, in countering the em-
ployer's claim of a violation of his rights, acknowledged cases in which employees were "act-
ing in the lawful exercise of some distinct right, which furnished the defence of a justifiable
cause for their acts, except so far as they were in violation of a superior right in another."
107 Mass. at 563.
02 See 155 Mass. at 121, 28 N.E. at 1126-27. The court virtually ignored the correspond-
ing rights of employer and employee to receive the performance bargained for and to receive
payment for that performance. Instead, the court focused on the employer's general rights
to secure property and to make reasonable and proper contracts, which effectively raised the
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ered to result in a right to be paid and had the employer's correla-
tive duty to pay been acknowledged by the court, the court might
have found itself in a dilemma. This dilemma would result from
the possible conflict between the employer's duty and its immunity
from government interference, and the confusion of the weavers'
rights to payment, duty to perform their contracts, and immunity
from government intervention on the employer's side."3 This, in
turn, might have raised the possibility of overlapping "public" and
"private" law, a circumstance that was neatly avoided by ignoring
the very question of the weavers' rights. The Perry decision exem-
plifies the model of logically complementary rights. Under the
model, it should never be necessary to do more than state one
party's rights in order to define the rights of the other and dissolve
apparent conflict by reference to factual matters. Any rights of the
weavers in Perry that were not encompassed in the general, funda-
mental right of every citizen to make reasonable contracts must, by
logical necessity, have begun where the employer's rights left off.
In Vegelahn v. Guntner," the Massachusetts court once again
considered only the rights of the winning party."' The court
observed:
An employer has a right to engage all persons who are willing to
work for him, at such prices as may be mutually agreed upon, and
persons employed or seeking employment have a corresponding
right to enter into or remain in the employment of any person or
corporation willing to employ them. These rights are secured by
employer's rights to a level superior to any concurrent right held by the employees and
thereby reduced any actions taken by workers to indefensible violations of these superior
rights. Id. at 121-22, 28 N.E. at 1127. From these rights a third right apparently was extra-
polated-the right to withhold payment for deficient performance. Id. at 122, 28 N.E. at
1126.
63 The constitutional proscription against statutes that violate contractual rights places
a disability on the government. See id. at 120-21, 28 N.E. at 1126-27. Since the correlative of
a disability is an immunity, the government's inability to legislate certain controls over busi-
ness amounts to an immunity from government interference. See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at
55-58.
" 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
63 Id. at 98-99, 44 N.E. at 1077-78. The union in Vegelahn sought to buttress its strike
against the employer by means that ranged from violence to non-violent picketing. Id. at 97,
44 N.E. at 1077. The employer had sought a preliminary injunction against all union activi-
ties, and the motion was heard by Justice Holmes. Justice Holmes granted an injunction
pendente lite against the violent activities, but refused to enjoin the peaceful picketing by a
limited number of workers. The permanent injunction issued by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts went beyond Justice Holmes' temporary injunction, limiting all union ac-
tivities, whether violent or peaceful. Id. at 98, 44 N.E. at 1078.
19831
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the constitution itself.66
The employer's "right" is, in actuality, a privilege.6 From this
privilege, the court concluded that the union had a duty not to
picket, 8 and from that duty a different right than the one initially
stated was inferred-a right not simply to engage willing workers,
but to do so without any publicity concerning the existence of a
labor dispute.6 ' There is no logical development from the court's
initial statement to its conclusion, and nothing inherent in the def-
inition of the plaintiff's "right" that would have precluded recogni-
tion of a union privilege to picket.70 By mischaracterizing both
what the employer had and what the union claimed, the court cre-
ated a new right where ostensibly it was only applying existing
rules.
The court's statement of the rights of the nonunion workers in
Vegelahn also was treated simply as part of the logical exposition,
but involved a substantive conclusion regarding the nature and
scope of rights that were then in controversy. By discussing the
right of "persons employed. . . to enter into or remain in the em-
ployment," the court elevated a privilege into a right 1 and pre-
cluded a decision on the status of a somewhat different right or
privilege-the possible right of current and potential employees to
be informed, through non-violent picketing, or even by the em-
ployer, that the plaintiff was considered unfair to organized la-
bor.72 The court did not reject the existence of such a right; it elim-
" Id. at 97, 44 N.E. at 1077.
"See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
167 Mass. at 98-99, 44 N.E. at 1077-78. Labeling the legal interest of the employer as
a right instead of a privilege facilitated the court's finding that even peaceful picketing was
unlawful, since the logical correlative duty of the right to hire was the duty not to interfere
with hiring, and any form of picketing implies some degree of interference with normal hir-
ing practices. See id. at 97-98, 44 N.E. at 1077.
- See id. The Vegelahn majority noted that the union's violation of its duty not to
picket would render employment "unpleasant or intolerable." Id. Picketing, the court con-
cluded, "is an unlawful interference with the rights both of employer and of employed." Id.
1o The Vegelahn court stated that the employer had "a right to engage all persons who
are willing to work for him .... " Id. A union privilege to picket would be defined, in
Hohfeldian terminology, not in relation to this right, but in relation to a correlative no-right
of the employer. See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 33. Such a correlative could be stated as a
no-right to interfere with peaceful picketing.
7' See Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 97, 44 N.E. at 1077-78; Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 30-32;
supra notes 48 & 65-68 and accompanying text.
72 See Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 32-34. A finding for employees of a right to informa-
tion might give rise to the correlative duty on the part of the employer to allow the union to
engage in informational picketing, or even to a duty of the employer to inform scabs that
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inated it from consideration.
Justice Holmes, dissenting in Vegelahn,7 3 authored an influen-
tial attack on the implicit presumption of the majority that its de-
cision was purely a "legal" one:
[I]n numberless instances the law warrants the intentional inflic-
tion of temporal damage, because it regards it as justified. It is on
the question of what shall amount to a justification, and more
especially on the nature of the considerations which really deter-
mine or ought to determine the answer to that question, that ju-
dicial reasoning seems to me often to be inadequate. The true
grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social ad-
vantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained
merely by logic and general propositions of law which nobody
disputes.7 4
Justice Holmes concluded:
If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view,
among other things, to getting as much as they can for their la-
bor, just as capital may combine with a view to getting the great-
est possible return, it must be true that, when combined, they
have the same liberty that combined capital has, to support their
they are hired as such. See id. at 30-32. The union thus would have a privilege to picket,
with a correlative no-right of the employer to interfere. Today, informational picketing is
protected by section 8(b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act, which contains the
provision that "picketing... for the purpose of truthfully advising the public ... that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization," is not
prohibited. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976); see, e.g., Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel &
Restaurant Employees, 135 N.L.R.B. 1183, 1184-85 (1962) (construing the exemption in the
NLRA for informational picketing). Such picketing is illegal, however, when its effect is "to
induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to
pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services." 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
73 167 Mass. at 104-09, 44 N.E. at 1079-82 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Courts routinely
cite Holmes' dissent in Vegelahn when determining the lawfulness of questionable and mar-
ginal actions. E.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467, 471 (3d Cir.
1978) (historical evolution of unionism in American mining industry reflects inferior bar-
gaining position of unions); Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 137
n.10 (2d Cir. 1945) (policy considerations are a strong influence on development of legal
rules).
" Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 105-06, 44 N.E. at 1080 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes fur-
ther wrote:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the
effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society,
disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible
return.
Id. at 108, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of
those advantages which they otherwise lawfully control.... The
fact that the immediate object of the act by which the benefit to
themselves is to be gained is to injure their antagonist does not
necessarily make it unlawful, any more than when a great house
lowers the price of goods for the purpose and with the effect of
driving a smaller antagonist from the business.7
These cases illustrate how the Massachusetts court reached
conclusions that appeared to be exercises in deduction from funda-
mental "legal" principles, but in fact were unjustified even by their
own terms. By treating mere privileges as rights and by willfully
refusing to recognize claims of conflicting rights, the court failed to
explain why one privilege should be elevated to a right and another
should be disregarded entirely. Though the rules stated in these
cases were clear and enforceable in ways which some of those dis-
cussed below were not, they remained mere post hoc justifications
for politically-biased decisions in favor of propertied plaintiffs.
Vegelahn was followed by a series of cases in which the Mas-
sachusetts court attempted to deal in different ways with the at-
tack on the model of logically defined and consistent, mutually
compatible rights presented in Justice Holmes' dissent.76 These
later cases reflect an effort to keep the construct fundamentally
intact while acknowledging that the technique of focusing solely on
the winner's rights was unworkable.
The most thorough concession to Justice Holmes' position oc-
curred in Plant v. Woods,7 7 in which the court held that strikes to
form closed shops were illegal as a matter of law.78 In Plant, suit
was brought against a union by former union dissidents who had
become members of a rival union.7 9 The union struck to have the
plaintiffs excluded from any shop in which members of the defend-
7 Id. at 1081-82.
70 See, e.g., Simon v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 18 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1938). Justice
Holmes argued in Vegelahn that just as an employer had the right to contract and establish
a business, the workers had the right to combine to seek better wages and conditions. 167
Mass. at 108-09, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes viewed these con-
flicting rights as compatible in the sense that they could exist coextensively, and were in
fact necessary to maintain a just balance. Id. at 108-09, 44 N.E. at 1081-82. (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
17 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
70 Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015. The legality of engaging in a strike to achieve a closed
shop was passed upon more often by the Massachusetts courts than by those of any other
jurisdiction. E. Wrrrz, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DispUTrs 23 & n.2 (1932).
70 176 Mass. 492, 494, 57 N.E. 1011, 1012 (1900).
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ant union worked.80 The strike, although peaceful, was found by
the court to carry an implicit threat of economic harm to the em-
ployers.81 The court characterized the primary right involved
as the right "to dispose of one's labor with full freedom," a right
which "is a legal right, and . . . entitled to legal protection. 8 2
Nevertheless, it recognized that "in many cases the lawfulness of
an act which causes damage to another may depend upon whether
the act is for justifiable cause ... ." Having acknowledged that a
mere statement of the plaintiff's rights did not resolve the issue
before it, the court concluded by finding that "[t]he necessity that
the plaintiffs ... join [the] association" did not justify the defend-
ant's interference with the right of the plaintiffs to "be free from
molestation," and held for the plaintiffs." The last part of the de-
cision might have been modeled directly on Justice Holmes' dis-
sent in Vegelahn s5 although Justice Holmes himself dissented in
Plant, accepting the form of the court's argument, but rejecting its
conclusion.86
8o Id. at 496, 57 N.E. at 1012. The defendant union informed the employer that it con-
sidered the plaintiffs to be non-union workers, and requested that the employer induce the
plaintiffs to rejoin the union. Id. at 495, 57 N.E. at 1012. The failure of this attempted
reunification of the plaintiffs with the defendant union caused the union to strike. Id. at
496, 57 N.E. at 1012. The union's objective was to organize all workers in the craft into one
union, thereby strengthening its own bargaining power. Id.
61 Id. at 496-97, 57 N.E. at 1012-13. Despite the absence of direct threats of personal
violence, Judge Hammond concluded that the defendant union had used coercion, intimida-
tion, and threats of property loss against the employer to effectuate its plan against the
plaintiff union. Id. at 496-97, 57 N.E. at 1012. The court interpreted the actions of the
defendant union to mean that:
[T]he employer may reasonably expect that unlawful physical injury may be done
to his property; that attempts in all the ways practiced by organized labor will be
made to injure him in his business,. .. and that ... attempts will be made to
intimidate those who enter or desire to enter his employ ....
Id. at 496-97, 57 N.E. at 1013.
82 Id. at 498, 57 N.E. at 1013.
83 Id. at 499, 57 N.E. at 1014.
- Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015.
'5 See Vegelan v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
8 176 Mass. at 504-05, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). Dissenting, Chief
Justice Holmes indicated that the majority decision, although employing the same reasoning
that he had used in his Vegelahn dissent, was contrary to his holding on the issue due to "a
difference of degree." Id. at 504, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). Justice Holmes
believed that the union's purpose in threatening to strike or boycott the employer-to
strengthen itself-was sufficient justification. Id. at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dis-
senting). The majority, according to Chief Justice Holmes, held that this purpose was too
remote or indirect, whereas a purpose concerned directly with wages would have provided
adequate justification. Id. at 504, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
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In Berry v. Donovan, 7 the Massachusetts court again acted on
Justice Holmes' call for judicial justification of decisions in terms
of political and economic policy. In so doing, it held a union liable
in tort for causing the discharge of a non-union worker pursuant to
a closed shop agreement with the employer.8 Berry represents an
almost pure exercise in sociological jurisprudence. In addressing
the question of whether the union could enforce its closed shop
contract, Chief Justice Knowlton declared:
The primary right of the plaintiff to have the benefit of his
contract and to remain undisturbed in the performance of it is
universally recognized. The right to dispose of one's labor as he
will, and to have the benefit of one's lawful contracts, is incident
to the freedom of the individual, which lies at the foundation of
the government in all countries that maintain the principles of
civil liberty. Such a right can lawfully be interfered with only by
one who is acting in the exercise of an equal or superior right
which comes in conflict with the other.8
The union did not have "an equal or superior right," the court
reasoned, since the contract between the union and the employer,
which called for the dismissal of non-union employees, was irrele-
vant to the action between the worker and the union 0 The court
found that public policy and support for established rights necessi-
tated drawing a new factual distinction between direct and indi-
rect efforts to win shorter hours, better working conditions and
higher wages,91 and noted that a strike for higher pay was factually
Holmes concluded by stating that it is "lawful for a body of workmen to try by combination
to get more than they now are getting, although they do it at the expense of their fellows,
and to that end to strengthen their union by the boycott and the strike." Id. at 505, 57 N.E.
at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
87 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905).
88 Id. at 355-56, 74 N.E. at 604. The plaintiff had worked 4 years for a company under a
contract that was terminable at will, and subsequently entered into a contract with the em-
ployer in which the employer promised to hire only union members. Id. at 354, 74 N.E. at
604. As to persons already employed, the employer agreed "not to retain any shoe worker in
his employment after receiving notice from the union that such shoe worker is objectionable
to the union... [for] any... cause." Id. After the contract was executed, the plaintiff
repeatedly refused to join the union and the defendant notified the employer that the plain-
tiff was considered objectionable and demanded that his employment be terminated. Id.
The union claimed that it was acting in accordance with its contract with the company and
was justified in demanding the plaintiff's termination. Id.
88 Id. at 355-56, 74 N.E. at 604.
0 See id. at 356-57, 74 N.E. at 604-05.
91 Id. For an extensive discussion of the use of the direct-indirect distinction in Massa-
chusetts, see infra notes 200-36 and accompanying text.
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distinct from a strike for a closed shop intended to empower the
employees to achieve higher wages at a later date.9 2 Such a distinc-
tion is a real one in the sense that there is a true factual difference
between the two kinds of strikes, but it is contrived in the sense
that many factual differences exist which do not result in legal dis-
tinctions. For example, it will certainly be true that participants in
different strikes will have different, and presumably legally irrele-
vant, physical characteristics. The distinctions attain legal signifi-
cance only when the court attributes such import to them. Having
given significance to this previously irrelevant factual distinction,
the Berry court was able to delineate a structure of complementary
rights.9 In doing so, though, the court demonstrated that rights
could always be made compatible by this sort of re-characteriza-
tion of the facts, and that this process ultimately could deprive a
system of rights of its power to generate sufficiently general legal
answers. Ostensibly, existing legal rules determine which facts are
"legally relevant"; application of these rules to the facts is sup-
posed to be what produces legal holdings.94 However far this ideal
may be from reality, it is completely undercut if the courts can
redefine what is "legally relevant" in order to reach a predeter-
mined outcome. Taken to its extreme, this process of discovering
newly relevant facts can produce a new "right" for every new set of
facts as, for example, the right of red-headed employers to compre-
hensive injunctions against left-handed picketers. The Berry court
retained the illusion that it was preserving existing rights as be-
tween unions and employers by inventing the direct-indirect dis-
tinction. Subsequent courts paid for that decision by having to re-
sort to increasingly obscure factual refinements in an effort to
preserve the appearance of unchanging rights.95
Despite the Berry court's effort to reduce the conflict of rights
to a clear factual question, the breakdown of the absolute barriers
around rights continued apace. In L.D. Willcutt & Sons v. Brick-
layers' Benevolent and Protective Union No. 3,96 Justice Ham-
" See 188 Mass. at 358-59, 74 N.E. at 605-06.
,3 Id. at 355-56, 74 N.E. at 604. Consistent with the structure of complementary rights,
the Berry court identified the rights of the parties but then focused on an employee's right
to perform his contract without being disturbed, effectively disregarding the union's rights.
See id. at 358-59, 74 N.E. at 605-06.
" See Legal Analysis, supra note 40, at 476; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 711-12 (1916).
" See infra notes 216-36 and accompanying text.
" 200 Mass. 110, 85 N.E. 897 (1908).
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mond, after describing the rights of the plaintiff employer, ob-
served:
The defendants also have rights. They have the right to work
or not to work, to sell their labor upon such terms as they see fit
and to combine for the purpose of getting more pay or a shorter
day....
But not much progress is made by this general statement of
the rights of the respective parties. We are still only on the skir-
mish line. In the jurisprudence of any civilized country there are
but few, if any, absolute rights-rights which bend to nothing and
to which everything else must bend....
In the case before us, standing opposed to each other are
these two rights: The right of the employer to a free labor market,
and the right of the striking employ~s in their strife with him to
impair that freedom; and the crucial question is, how far can the
latter go?91
Only 12 years earlier, the Vegelahn court appeared unaware of
the possibility of the conflict of rights, 8 and 4 years after Vege-
lahn, Justice Hammond had written about conflicts between "im-
portant principles," rather than confronting the issue of conflicting
rights.99 While Willcutt was not the first case to address the con-
cept of conflicting rights, it is a remarkably clear assertion of the
position that the mere definition of "rights" cannot, of itself, re-
solve legal conflicts.100 The Willcutt court squarely addressed the
problem, stating that "neither the right of the plaintiff to a free
labor market nor the right of the union to impose a fine upon its
members. . . is to be considered apart from the other, or without
reference to any other conflicting right, whether public or private
- Id. at 120, 85 N.E. at 901-02. The plaintiff employer was in the construction business.
Id. at 112, 85 N.E. at 900. The defendant union engaged in what the court characterized as a
justifiable strike for, inter alia, better wages and shorter hours. Id. at 114, 85 N.E. at 898-99.
In order to keep union men from returning to work, the union threatened to fine any strike-
breakers. Id. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the fines. Id. The court, in holding
for the plaintiff, recognized the employer's "common law right to a reasonably free labor
market." Id. at 117, 85 N.E. at 900.
"8 Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 97-98, 44 N.E. at 1077. For a discussion of Vegelahn, see
supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
" Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 497-98, 57 N.E. 1011, 1013 (1900). For a discussion of
Judge Hammond's treatment of rights in Plant, see supra notes 77-86 and accompanying
text.
'0o Willcutt, 200 Mass. at 118-19, 85 N.E. at 901.
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9 101
Yet, while cases like Willcutt and Berry presented a court em-
ploying the types of political justification for legal decisions that
were at the heart of sociological jurisprudence, the same court also
continued to engage in simple declarations of rights without justifi-
cation or explanation. In Reynolds v. Davis,102 decided the same
year as Willcutt, the court based its decision on a very narrow defi-
nition of the union's rights, and held that a strike to force employ-
ers to continue what had been an informal, oral closed shop agree-
ment that also gave a worker's committee extensive work-grievance
resolution power, was unlawful.10 3 The court observed that
"forc[ing] the employer to submit to a delegate body of employ6s
his rights under an existing contract by a combination for that
purpose is not a justifiable interference with their employer's busi-
ness. ' 10 4 The court did not say why the union's action was not a
justifiable interference. While this language was intended to pro-
vide the rationale of the decision, it was in fact the essence of its
conclusion.10 5 Although phrased in the terminology of "sociological
jurisprudence," the Reynolds decision is an example of a court de-
fining new legal rights and relationships under the guise of apply-
ing existing rules.
By the first decade of the 20th century, the Massachusetts
court no longer had a single clear vision, if it ever had one, of the
nature of rights and of their efficacy in generating legal results.
101 Id.
102 198 Mass. 294, 84 N.E. 457 (1908).
lo3 Id. at 299, 84 N.E. at 458-59. On May 1, 1906, the plaintiffs posted new rules declar-
ing that their shops were going to be operated as open shops. Id. Prior to this posting, the
plaintiffs had a verbal understanding with the defendant workers concerning wages, hours,
and employment of non-union workers. Id. at 296, 84 N.E. at 457. Under the old agreement,
the unions could establish councils that investigated employee grievances and decided how
to solve related problems. Id. at 299, 84 N.E. at 458. The unions were authorized to strike if
the employer refused to comply with the council's recommendations. By establishing an
open shop, the employers effectively rendered the council superfluous. Id. The union work-
ers went on a strike that on its face seemed to be an attempt to retain the closed shop, but
which the court characterized as aimed at retaining the prior dispute regulation system. Id.
Although the court conceded that a group of employees may work together "to support a
committee to take up individual grievances in behalf of the several members," it held that
any further action by this committee, such as compelling the employer to agree to its resolu-
tion of grievances via a strike, would be illegal. Id. at 300, 84 N.E. at 459.
104 Id.
1o5 See id. Chief Justice Knowlton characterized the majority's position as being
"equivalent to saying that no labor union shall be permitted to do anything to promote the
proper objects of its organization." Id. at 304, 84 N.E. at 460 (Knowlton, C.J., dissenting).
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The direct-indirect distinction was employed wherever possible to
allow the court to avoid the issue."' 6 When it was not possible to
employ that ostensibly factual standard, the court simply moved
from one conception of the nature of rights to another. Thus, in De
Minico v. Craig,0 7 the court opted for a relativistic view of rights
in deciding that a union could be enjoined from striking to force
the employer to fire an unpopular foreman.108 The court prefaced
its discussion by observing that it is for the court to determine
whether the intent behind a strike is a legal justification, and
stated:
The plaintiff [foreman] had a right to work and that right of his
could not be taken away from him or interfered with by the de-
fendants unless it came into conflict with an equal or superior
right of theirs. The defendants' right to better their condition is
such an equal right. But to humor their personal objections... is
not in our opinion a superior or an equal right. 09
Yet, in 1915, the court advised the Massachusetts Senate that a
proposed statute prohibiting railroads from firing employees on the
basis of information received, without allowing the discharged
worker to confront the informant, violated both the federal and
state constitutions since an employer has an absolute right to fire
its employees.110
Twenty years later, the Massachusetts court was still strug-
gling to resolve conflicts of rights by redefining the rights at issue
with increasing precision without justifying the redefinitions, as if
all that were needed was a perfect template of rights that could be
fitted into every factual situation. In Boylston Housing Corp. v.
O'Toole,"' the court faced a refusal by union men to work with
nonunion men on the installation of an elevator.1 2 The general
contractor sued both the union and the elevator company.'13 The
100 See infra notes 200-36 and accompanying text.
1*7 207 Mass. 593, 94 N.E. 317 (1911).
108 Id. at 599, 94 N.E. at 319-20. The court's opinion was not grounded, as it could have
been, on an argument that the employer was immune from government interference in its
dealings with employees. Instead, the court chose to "constitutionalize" employers' private
rights.
100 Id. at 599, 94 N.E. at 320.
110 In re Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 627, 631, 108 N.E. 807, 808 (1915).
"1 321 Mass. 538, 74 N.E.2d 288 (1947).
122 Id. at 547, 74 N.E.2d at 294.
18 Id. at 540-41, 74 N.E.2d at 291. The plaintiff sued for damages and a permanent
injunction. The lower court entered an interlocutory decree, temporarily enjoining the union
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court found for the defendants on the ground that the only legal
obligation that existed between the union and the elevator com-
pany was the closed shop agreement, which "contained no provi-
sion purporting to bind individual members of [the union] to enter
the employment of the defendant . .. [e]levator [c]ompany.' ' 14
The court noted:
Since no individual member of [the union] was bound by
contract to enter the employment of the defendant. . . , no such
member... had any duty to enter such employment or would be
guilty of any wrong to the plaintiff in refusing to enter such em-
ployment .... This right is not in conflict with or subordinate to
the right of the ... [e]levator [c]ompany, or of the plaintiff, to a
"free flow of labor". . . . Apart from contract, the right of a pro-
spective employer to hire an individual workman who does not
choose to be hired is no greater than the correlative right of such
individual workman acting singly to refuse to be hired.115
In some unexplained fashion, the employer's right to hire those
employees it wished to hire, now relabeled as the right to "a free
flow of labor," no longer was absolute, and had become equal to
the union's right. The possibility of conflict, however, was still
steadfastly denied.
Rights and Privileges in Illinois
The Illinois court was not as concerned with the definition of
rights as was the Massachusetts court. Nonetheless, Illinois courts
engaged intermittently in defining the rights of parties and, like
the Massachusetts court, often attached adjectives to the rights at-
tributed to the winning party in an attempt to establish the pre-
vailing rights as both unambiguous and clearly bounded. Thus, in
from "interfering" with the plaintiff's contract with the elevator company. Id. at 542, 74
N.E.2d at 292. Although the elevator installation was completed before the case went to trial
on the merits, the plaintiff continued to seek a permanent injunction to prevent union inter-
ference with any of the plaintiff's future contracts. Id.
1 Id. at 548, 74 N.E.2d at 295. The court noted that the closed shop agreement be-
tween the union and the elevator company purported only to prevent the latter from hiring
non-union workers, and did not require that union members work only for the elevator com-
pany. Id. The refusal by union members to do what they were not bound to do therefore was
not actionable. Id. Moreover, the court stated that the actions undertaken by the union did
not constitute a strike, since "[t]he basic element of a strike-the concerted cessation of
work by employees for their employer-. . . was absent" Id. at 553, 74 N.E.2d at 298.
11s Id. at 549, 74 N.E.2d at 295-96.
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1903, in Christensen v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co.,116 an
Illinois appellate judge observed:
Although it may be that no question of wages or hours of labor
was involved, the right of men to leave their employment for good
reasons or bad reasons, where no contract is broken, is as perfect
and complete as is the correlative right of all men to seek employ-
ment wherever they can find it, without let or hindrance, whether
belonging to labor organizations or not. These are common rights
secured by the constitution, which by its terms is established "to
secure the blessings of liberty" to all alike.111
This passage reinforces the concept of complementary rights from
two points of view: first, by describing the rights as "correlative,"
and second, by implying that they are common to both parties.
In A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No.
16,118 Justice Cartwright used the same approach as that occasion-
ally employed in Massachusetts, defining the rights of the losing
party by ignoring them.119 Barnes reaffirmed an earlier decision
which held picketing illegal per se.120 The Barnes court described
the right of an employer to replace striking workers as absolute, 21
I's 110 Ill. App. 61, affd sub nom. O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N.E. 108 (1905). In
Christensen, the union engaged in a strike after the employer refused to sign an agreement
that provided for, inter alia, employment of union members only and noninterference with
sympathetic strikes to protect union principles. 216 Ill. at 356-57, 75 N.E. at 109. An order
enjoining striking union members from threatening and carrying out acts of violence against
nonstriking or prospective employees was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at 376,
75 N.E. at 115.
127 110 I. App. at 71-72.
118 232 I. 424, 83 N.E. 940 (1908).
I's See id. at 431-33, 83 N.E. at 944-45. The Chicago Typographical Union called
a strike in an attempt to establish a closed shop and to attain an 8-hour workday. Id. at
427-28, 83 N.E. at 941-42. The unions also picketed the plaintiffs' businesses, effectively
preventing the plaintiffs from hiring replacements. Id. at 428, 83 N.E. at 942. In addition,
the union circulated a list of struck shops among the union's affiliated shops and ordered
the affiliates to boycott all work sent to them by the plaintiffs. Id. at 429-30, 83 N.E. at 942.
120 Id. at 435, 83 N.E. at 944; see Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 378, 77
N.E. 176, 185 (1906) (picketing by union is an unlawful interference with employer's rights
to employ freely and to control his business).
121 232 I. at 433, 83 N.E. at 943-44. Prior to Barnes, Justice Cartwright, dissenting in
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 I. 493, 69 N.E. 526 (1903), relied on a
concept of absolute rights and contended that the defendant insurance company had an
absolute right to cancel its policy with the insured, and that a threat to cancel its policy, for
any reason, could not be illegal or give rise to damages, even if done with actual malice. Id.
at 509, 69 N.E. at 532 (Wilkin & Cartwright, JJ., dissenting). By means of such analysis, the
dissenters defined the rights of the respective parties in a manner that simply ignored the
rights of the losing party. See id. at 511-12, 69 N.E. at 531-33 (Wilkin & Cartwright, JJ.,
dissenting).
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arriving at this conclusion by misreading an earlier case. 122 Al-
though in Kemp v. Division No. 24112- an Illinois appeals court
had rejected the contention that the rights of either party to a la-
bor dispute are absolute, the Illinois Supreme Court continued to
rely on the concept of absolute rights for approximately 20
years.
124
As in Massachusetts, the Illinois court would, on occasion, re-
solve a dispute by defining the rights of one party in terms of the
rights of the other. For example, in Anderson & Lind Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Carpenters' District Council, 25 one of several cases aris-
ing out of major carpenters' strikes in Chicago,1 26 Justice Cart-
wright acknowledged that unions had certain rights, but outlined
those rights by taking away everything that was within the court's
definition of the plaintiff's rights. 27 The issue was whether a series
of strikes against an employer over his use of trim made by a non-
union company violated an injunction against threatening, coerc-
ing, or intimidating any person dealing with the company. 128 Af-
firming the lower court's finding that the strike violated the
injunction, Justice Cartwright observed:
Every man has a right, under the law, to full freedom in the dis-
posal of his labor according to his own will, and the right of work-
men to organize for the purpose of promoting their common wel-
11 Barnes, 232 M1. at 433, 83 N.E. at 943-44; see Mathews v. People, 202 Il. 389, 401-
03, 67 N.E. 28, 32-33 (1903). Justice Cartwright cited Mathews for the proposition that an
employer's right to replace striking workers was absolute. 232 Ill. at 433, 83 N.E. at 943-44.
Mathews, however, merely held that state-established employment agencies could not dis-
tinguish between employers who sought workers to replace strikers and those who sought
new workers for other reasons. 202 Ill. at 401-03, 67 N.E. at 32-33.
is 153 11. App. 344 (1910), rev'd, 255 IlM. 213, 99 N.E. 389 (1912).
124 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
22 308 IlL 488, 139 N.E. 887 (1923).
2' In July 1919, the Chicago Carpenter's Union called a general strike against builders
who refused to raise the carpenter's minimum wage. Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors'
Ass'n, 305 IM. 331, 332, 137 N.E. 222, 222 (1922). In an effort to promote unionization
throughout the entire building industry, the union attempted to compel manufacturers of
carpenters' materials to operate union shops by striking builders that used their materials.
See Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 308 IIl. 488, 489-90, 139 N.E.
887, 889 (1923). The strikes effectively paralyzed the building industry in the Chicago area.
See Lee, Problems Which Have Arisen in Recent Labor Decisions in Illinois, 18 ILL. L. Ray.
77, 89 (1923).
117 308 Dl. at 496, 139 N.E. at 889-90.
'- Id. at 490-91, 139 N.E. at 888. In 1912, the defendant union was permanently en-
joined from directly or indirectly interfering with the plaintiff's business. Id. The injunction
was directed at the union's repeated orders to its members to stop working for the plaintiff.
Id.
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fare by lawful means is fully recognized and always maintained by
the courts. ... [B]ut it does not follow from the existence of
these rights that no one else has a legal right, which may be disre-
garded and invaded without committing a legal wrong .... It is
an absolute legal right of every person to carry on any legitimate
business, and to make and enforce all lawful contracts in the
prosecution of such business ...
Where it is alleged that a legal wrong has been done, the first
question to consider is the right of the party who alleges the
wrong, and not to begin with the question whether the alleged
wrongdoer would be benefited by his act.... If it is found that
the right existed, it could only be invaded by one who had an
equal or superior right....
The right of the complainant to carry on its business was ab-
solute, and not qualified by any right of the defendants to compel
it to operate a closed shop and employ only union labor.2 9
Throughout the first decades of the 20th century, the Illinois
court vacillated between a relativistic approach to rights, which ne-
cessitated justification of the ultimate decision, and a static view,
in which absolute rights existed in a factual vacuum. Thus, in
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union,130 the
court's treatment of rights was highly static. The court described
the nature of the employer's right and stated that "[t]he right to
acquire and protect property is an inherent right not given but de-
clared by the constitution," and contrasted this right with what it
29 Id. at 494-95, 139 N.E. at 889-90 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The tech-
nique of defining one party's rights in terms of the other party's rights could be used to the
union's advantage. For example, in Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 111 355, 77 N.E. 176
(1906), the dissent argued that peaceful picketing should be permitted. Id. at 384-85, 77
N.E. at 186-87 (Boggs & Scott, JJ., dissenting). The dissent asserted that this conclusion
followed logically from the court's description of the defendants' basic rights, the rights to
organize and to strike, and the narrow scope of the plaintiff's alleged right to be free from
that form of interference was presumed to follow from that description. Id. at 384-89, 77
N.E. at 186-88 (Boggs & Scott, JJ., dissenting).
The logical problem in the Franklin Union dissent is that it, in effect, elaborated only
the first and last parts of a syllogism. The main premise was that workers have the right to
organize for certain purposes, and to seek organization by "lawful means." The conclusion
that the dissenters wished to draw was that the defendants had acted legally. That conclu-
sion, however, follows only from a second premise, which is the unstated issue of the case: Is
picketing one of the lawful means by which a union may organize? The dissenters devoted
their intellectual energy to developing a broad, general description of rights without justify-
ing, or even identifying, the fundamental decision as to which facts would be subsumed
under the paradigm of rights.
1M0 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E.2d 308 (1939), affl'd, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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called "[t]he privilege of free speech.' 1 31 Although Meadowmoor is
illustrative of the static view towards rights, other opinions written
after this decision espoused a more relativistic view of rights. For
example, a few years after Meadowmoor, the court in Ellingsen v.
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union"'2 stated that:
It is an old maxim of law and justice as well as a living prin-
ciple of American free government, that one may not assume that
his right is so absolute that it may be exercised under any circum-
stances and without any qualification. All rights that exist in civi-
lized society must always be exercised with reasonable regard for
the conflicting rights of others....
This court has long recognized ... that these controversies
cannot occur without causing some damage; that, in a strict sense,
any action taken by striking workingmen or pickets . . .is to
some extent injury to the employer.133
THE CIRCULAR JUSTIFICATION OF LEGAL RULES
It is a virtual commonplace of post-Realist legal thought to
criticize decisions rendered in the heyday of legal formalism as the
products of hopelessly circular reasoning.13' Circular reasoning was
121 Id. at 393, 21 N.E.2d at 316. The majority asserted that an employer's right to con-
tract is not to be limited by the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act to the extent that business
would be destroyed and a growth of monopolies would result Id. at 385, 21 N.E.2d at 313.
In addition, the court emphatically stated that an employer's right to employ laborers and
to engage in business relations is paramount, and that "nothing in the . . .statute ...
prohibit[ed] the issu[ance] of an injunction to restrain boycotting." Id. For a more extensive
discussion of Meadowmoor and the court's interpretation of the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act,
see infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
In Swing v. American Fed'n of Labor, 372 Ill. 91, 22 N.E.2d 857 (1939), rev'd, 312 U.S.
321 (1941), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is right for men to earn their living
by honest means within the law and it is wrong for others either singly or in combination to
prevent such honest labor by any unlawful means ...... Id. at 96, 22 N.E.2d at 859. Swing,
however, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that it would
violate the guarantee of freedom of speech to hold "that there can be no 'peaceful picketing
or peaceful persuasion' in relation to any dispute between an employer and a trade union
unless the employer's own employees are in controversy with him." 312 U.S. at 325.
1 377 Ill. 76, 35 N.E.2d 349 (1941).
" Id. at 83, 35 N.E.2d at 352. The Ellingsen court recognized the defendant union's
right to picket stores in a peaceful manner, id., but determined that threats and attempts to
coerce by intimidation did not constitute peaceful picketing, id. at 86, 35 N.E.2d at 354.
134 See M. CosmN, REASON AND LAw 123 (1950). "Legal Realism" is the name commonly
given to the legal movement that followed sociological jurisprudence in the 1920's and
1930's, a movement that generally is credited with applying scientific empiricism, or even
positivism, to legal thought Legal Realists tend to argue that each case must be analyzed
both as behavior and in terms of the behavior that the decision process and holding are
intended to elicit They radically reject the idea that "the law" consists of abstract and
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indeed utilized by legal formalists in resolving labor disputes
throughout the period discussed in this Article.3 5 Courts in both
Massachusetts and Illinois relied on one obvious device-the con-
cept of "malice"-to decide labor disputes. The Massachusetts
court also used the less obvious, but no less circular concept of
"the natural laws of business" to justify its labor decisions.
There are two senses in which the word "malice" appears in a
legal decision. One sense is both colloquial and factual-an act is
malicious if it is malevolent, or performed for unworthy motives of
spite or dislike.136 The second way in which malice reasonably
might appear in a legal decision is as a legal category-an act is
malicious at law if it is performed without legal justification.137 In
the second case, the term malice is just a shorthand expression for
the legal conclusion that the injurious act in question was not
justified.13 8
Colloquial malice is not a subject of this Article since in labor
cases it rarely was alleged that unions were acting out of simple
spite or malevolence.13 9 Yet, it was common for judges in the first
decades of modern labor law to refer to the actions of unions as
"malicious" as if that was a finding of fact, in order to support a
legal conclusion that the union's actions were not legally justified.
As the question in these cases, particularly where the issues were
of first impression, was whether various union actions were legally
justifiable, the conclusion that the actions were unjustified because
general rules that can be applied to facts in a simple logical process. See generally E. Pun-
CELL, THE Cassis oF DsmocRATic THEORY 74-94 (1973); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 835-49 (1935).
185 See S. COHEN, LABOR LAW 108-37 (1964); see also Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 IML 608,
615, 52 N.E. 924, 926 (1898) (a wrongful act is malicious, and a malicious act is unlawful);
Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 260, 69 N.E. 1085, 1087 (1904) ("natural laws of business"
are foundation upon which right of competition is based); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555,
564 (1871) (malicious acts are not justified, and unjustified acts are malicious).
1" See Holmes, supra note 23, at 2; Lewis, Should the Motive of the Defendant Affect
the Question of his Liability?-The Answer of One Class of Trade and Labor Cases, 5
COLum. L. Rav. 107, 110-11 (1905). There are legal refinements of colloquial malice, such as
the "actual malice" standard promulgated by the landmark defamation case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The New York Times Court defined
malice as a statement made by a news medium in reckless disregard for the truth. Id. How-
ever, except to the extent that "reckless disregard" becomes a term of art, at which point
"actual malice" shades into "malice at law," this refinement does not represent a wholly
separate way of looking at the issue of malice.
1'87 See C. GREGORY, supra note 19, at 94; Freund, Malice and Unlawful Interference,
11 HARv. L. Rnv. 449, 461 (1898).
11 See C. GREGORY, supra note 19, at 88-94.
'9 See S. COHEN, supra note 135, at 102; N. FALCoNE, LABOR LAw 43-45 (1962).
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they were unjustified, or malicious at law, was hardly satisfactory.
The appeal of the concept of malice, despite its fundamental
inadequacy, is apparent for a judiciary that desired to control
union activity while maintaining apparent neutrality. The very use
of the term malice insured that the party to whom it was applied
would lose, since finding for a party that acted maliciously was un-
thinkable. 140 The use of malice allowed the system to continue to
appear to be one of complementary and equal rights, brought into
conflict only by behavior which clearly was unacceptable when
judged by a standard external to any particular dispute.
The "natural laws of business" device, as employed by the
Massachusetts court, was both similar to and dissimilar to malice.
Like malice, it was used as a shorthand description of the rights of
a party, and constituted an apparently external standard that was
circular on its face. Unlike malice, however, this phrase was intro-
duced into labor jurisprudence as a means of creating rights, not as
a means of negating them. These devices-malice and natural
law-did not become circular as they were developed and used;
rather, they were never anything else. They are important because
they were treated by courts as "external" standards by which ac-
tions could be judged, but they never had any content other than
that provided by the cases ostensibly relying on them. Their ap-
parent neutrality made them particularly effective at camouflaging
the real nature of the decisions of the courts that relied on them.
Malice and The Natural Laws of Business in Massachusetts
The use of malice as an apparent factual finding to disguise a
true legal holding was abandoned quite early by the Massachusetts
court. It appeared only once in its pure form, in Walker v.
Cronin.1" The Walker court found the union's behavior in induc-
ing employees to leave a non-union employer to be tortious. As
noted above, the court's chief thrust in Walker was to distinguish
between the no-rights of the union in the given factual situation
and the rights of business competitors. 42 However, perhaps be-
cause the court recognized that it had defined an employer privi-
lege, and that merely distinguishing the union from a business
140 Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n, 305 ]M1. 331, 337, 137 N.E. 222, 224 (1922).
141 107 Mass. 555, 564 (1871).
142 For a discussion of the Massachusetts court's treatment of the party's rights in
Walker, see supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
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competitor did not explain or justify an imposition of liability on
the union, the court stated:
Every one has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of
his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to
be protected against competition; but he has a right to be free
from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoy-
ance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the
exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, un-
less some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered
with. But if it come from the merely wanton or malicious acts of
others, without the justification of competition or the service of
any interest or lawful purpose, it then stands upon a different
footing. 14
The Walker opinion is a good example of circular reasoning in the
guise of factfinding. The court recognized that some purposes give
legal justification to interference between an employer and em-
ployees. The issue before it, then, was whether the purpose for
which the union induced the plaintiff's employees to quit was such
a purpose.144 The court found that the purpose was not a legal one
such as to provide legal justification, 145 and instead of stating its
finding as a legal conclusion, it couched it as a factual finding. The
act was characterized as malicious and therefore unjustified; it was
unjustified and therefore malicious.
By 1900, the Massachusetts court recognized that once collo-
quial malice had been eliminated from judicial consideration, mal-
ice at law could only be part of a legal conclusion, and not a legal
argument. In Plant v. Woods,146 the court reasoned:
The necessity that the plaintiffs should join this association is not
so great, nor is its relation to the rights of the defendants, as com-
pared with the right of the plaintiffs to be free from molestation,
such as to bring the acts of the defendant under the shelter of the
principles of trade competition. Such acts are without justifica-
tion, and therefore are malicious and unlawful .... 147
143 107 Mass. at 564 (emphasis added).
144 Id. at 561.
145 Id. at 566.
141 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
147 Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015. For a discussion of the facts in Plant and the court's
treatment of the rights of the parties involved, see supra notes 77-86 and accompanying
text. See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text (analysis of the Plant court's use of the
direct-indirect distinction).
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Although the blatantly circular use of malice was quickly
abandoned by the Massachusetts court, circular logic was soon res-
urrected in Massachusetts with the development of the more sub-
tle concept of "the natural laws of business" as a justification for
labor decisions. Carew v. Rutherford148 had been the first Massa-
chusetts case to discuss "freedom of business," a forerunner of the
"natural laws of business" device that would appear in later cases.
The Carew court held that it was tortious for a union to fine an
employer for sending work out of state,14 9 and attempted to define
the opposing rights of the union and the employer, justifying its
decision by stating:
This principle does not interfere with the freedom of busi-
ness, but protects it. Every man has a right to determine what
branch of business he will pursue, and to make his own contracts
with whom he pleases and on the best terms he can.... And it
is no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object
in view, to associate themselves together and agree that they will
not work for or deal with certain men or classes of men, or work
under a certain price, or without certain conditions....
Freedom is the policy of this country. But freedom does not
imply a right in one person, either alone or in combination with
others, to disturb or annoy another, either directly or indirectly,
in his lawful business or occupation, or to threaten him with an-
noyance or injury, for the sake of compelling him to buy his peace
150
The key phrase is in the first paragraph above: "And it is no
crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object in
view. . . ." Since the union's actions were neither violent nor un-
lawful on their face, the sole question was whether the union's ob-
ject was a lawful one.15 It was only after the judges determined
the outcome, which allegedly was based on "freedom of business,"
a right common to both parties, that they could determine how the
concept of "freedom of business" would govern the union's acts. s
148 106 Mass. 1 (1870).
149 Id. at 13-14.
15 Id. at 14-15.
5 Id. at 6-8 (union's actions consisted of threats that if plaintiff refused to pay fine of
$500, union members would walk off job). The question for the court was whether the facts
constituted an unlawful interference with the plaintiff's legal rights. Id. at 9.
,1, See id. at 13-14. The court observed that the defendants' intentional acts caused
injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 13. Therefore, the court opined, the defendants were liable in
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Freedom of business was supposed to operate as an abstract, gen-
eral principle from which the specific rights of the union and the
employer could be derived.15 The effort was, at least in Carew,
unsuccessful because freedom of business had no meaning in this
context until the court gave it one through its holding.
The next employment of the concept of the natural laws of
business in a Massachusetts decision was not until 1902. Rendered
subsequent to Justice Holmes' dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner,'"
Justice Hammond's opinion in Martell v. White'" represented a
rediscovering of natural law as a way to rescue the concept of justi-
fication from the political and reinstate it in the objective world of
legal logic. Justice Hammond wrote:
The trader has not a free lance. He may fight, but as a soldier,
not as a guerilla. The right of competition rests upon the doctrine
that the interests of the great public are best subserved by per-
mitting the general and natural laws of business to have their full
and free operation, and that this end is best attained when the
trader is allowed, in his business, to make free use of these
laws.IN
Justice Hammond clearly was responding to Justice Holmes'
argument that issues of justification could be resolved only by an
articulated statement of policy,157 and suggesting the natural laws
of business as an alternative ground for decisionmaking. 58 The is-
sue in Martell, however, was whether an association of manufac-
turers could boycott another manufacturer whose behavior
threatened it with economic harm. 59 This case determined how
the natural laws of business dictated behavior; natural law was not
tort for the resulting damage. Id. at 13-14. Only after establishing the liability of the defen-
dants did the court address the specific rights that the plaintiff allegedly enjoyed, and did so
in terms of broad generalities, contrasting modern "freedom of business" with ancient re-
strictions on workers. Id. at 14-15.
See id. at 14-15.
'"See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
155 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904).
15 Id. at 260-61, 69 N.E. at 1087.
"B See supra notes 73-75.
' 185 Mass. at 261, 69 N.E. at 1087-88.
"' Id. at 257, 69 N.E. at 1085-86. The Martell court reversed a verdict for the defen-
dants and held that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 263, 69 N.E. at
1089. The court reasoned that although the object of the boycott was a more favorable com-
petitive market, which was not itself illegal, the coercive means by which this object was
effected-the imposition of fines-rendered the issue ripe for jury determination. Id. at 262,
69 N.E. at 1087-89.
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determined by those laws. 160
Justice Hammond also wrote the majority opinion in L.D.
Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent & Protective
Union No. 3,161 a case involving a union that fined members for
refusing to join what the court called a lawful strike. 1 2 After en-
gaging in a prolonged discussion of the nature of the opposing
rights, the court held against the union, concluding:
If the contest be carried on under the rules which regulate the law
of supply and demand, leaving those engaged on either side to act
under the general and natural laws of business, free from artificial
coercion or intimidation as the words are ordinarily understood
. .. , then nether [sic] party has the right to complain; but if the
coercion or intimidation by threats of a direct personal loss, [is]
due... to a cause having no natural relation to the situation and
entirely inconsistent with the basic principle of freedom of action
under the natural laws of business, then there is cause for the
complaint.16 3
In Haverhill Strand Theater, Inc. v. Gillen,", the court once
again invoked the natural laws of business. Haverhill involved a
dispute over whether a union could strike to force the employer to
hire a minimum number of workers for a given job.165 In holding
160 See id. The court noted that the natural laws of business fostered a competitive
market, and stated that a damage award could not be based on the elimination of a compet-
itor alone, but rather, is warranted only if injury results from violation of the rules of com-
petitive warfare. Id. at 261, 69 N.E. at 1087-88. The court observed that no justification
exists for fraudulent or obstructive interference with another's business. Id. at 261, 69 N.E..
at 1088. That is, competition alone, notwithstanding its characterization as a natural law of
business, cannot justify coercive and illegal acts. Id. The circularity of Justice Hammond's
opinion is disguised by his apparent confidence that "natural law" makes the sort of fine
distinction called for under the facts of the case between acceptable and impermissible
forms of competition. Once one gets past that assumption, the fallacy inherent in Justice
Hammond's reasoning is apparent: a boycott that is compelled by the use of fines violates
the rules of competitive economic warfare and is therefore illegal; because it is illegal, it
violates the rules of competitive economic warfare.
1 200 Mass. 110, 85 N.E. 897 (1908).
242 Id. at 121, 85 N.E. at 898-99. In a striking example of how some judges characterize
certain rights as having special, almost sacred, status, Judge Hammond wrote:
It is to be premised that the right which the plaintiff seeks to have protected
against the acts of the defendants arises from no contract or statute, but out of
the ... large body of rights which have their foundation in the fitting necessities
of civilized society.
Id. at 117, 85 N.E. at 900.
1 Willcutt, 200 Mass. at 125-26, 85 N.E. at 904.
14 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671 (1918).
1 Id. at 415-16, 118 N.E. at 672. In Haverhill, the plaintiff-theater corporation em-
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against the union, Justice Loring stated:
It is manifest that such a rule is an interference with the plain-
tiff's right to that free flow of labor to which every member of the
community is entitled for the purpose of carrying on the business
in which he or it has chosen to embark. The right to the free flow
of labor is not an absolute right; it is limited by the right of em-
ploy6s to combine for purposes which in the eye of the law justify
interference with the plaintiff's right to a free flow of labor. A
combination which interferes with a plaintiff's right to a free flow
of labor is legal if the purpose for which it is made justifies the
interference with that right. On the other hand, it is illegal if that
purpose does not justify the interference .... It is ... settled
. . . that the question. . . is a question of law. .... 166
The right to a free flow of labor is somewhat more specific
than the right to act under the benevolent rules of the natural laws
of business, but still lacks enough specific content to carry the
weight of the court's decision. 167 Further, it is a Iohfeldian privi-
lege rather than a right;16 8 elevating it to a right, thus implying a
correlative duty of absolute noninterference, requires some justifi-
ployed a single member of the musician's union. Id. The union previously had adopted a
rule that required employment of at least five union musicians by any employer who hired a
union member. Id. The plaintiff sued to enjoin enforcement of the rules on the ground that
they constituted an unlawful interference with the plaintiff's right to a free flow of labor.
Id. at 417, 118 N.E. at 673.
' Id. at 418, 118 N.E. at 673 (citations omitted).
167 See id at 420-21, 118 N.E. at 674. The court did not define the "right" to a free flow
of labor, but rather labeled it a general rule governing the businesses of a given community.
See id. at 420, 118 N.E. at 673. The particular right to employ whomever one chooses pre-
sumably is derived from the general principles of freedom of labor and business. See infra
note 170. Liability results if injury is caused by interference with specific rights. See Legal
Analysis, supra note 40, at 476. Although interference with a general principle may result in
liability, see Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 14 (1870), it is the violation of the specific
rights embraced by the principle that warrants redress, see id. at 14-15; Hohfeld, supra note
94, at 746 ("the exact nature of... rights has been greatly obscured.., by the habitual
tendency to treat a multiplicity of fundamentally similar rights, or claims, as if they were
only one").
16 If the right to the free flow of labor were truly a Hohfeldian right, a correlative duty
would be imposed on the union to forbear from interference with that right. See Legal
Analysis, supra note 40, at 476. The court, however, determined the boundaries of the right
to the free flow of labor to be the right of laborers to combine for lawful purposes. 229 Mass.
at 420, 118 N.E. at 673. In acknowledging, then, that the employer's right to the free flow of
labor is bounded by the right of workers to combine and to refuse to work for an employer,
the court engaged in circular reasoning. The employer's right to a free flow of labor both
defines and is bounded by the employees' "proper" right to refuse to work; the employees'
refusal to work was not proper because it interfered with the employer's right to a free flow
of labor.
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cation, which the court notably failed to give.1 6 Finally, while the
phrase "the free flow of labor" is an obvious derivative of the "nat-
ural laws of business," the use to which it is put in this passage is
somewhat different. The natural laws of business were something
to which both employers and workers were subject in Justice Ham-
mond's scheme; the right to a free flow of labor was attributed
solely to the employer. 17 0 What had begun as an attempt to resolve
the conflict of rights in the labor field into a harmonious common
right had been reduced to yet another method of describing the
rights of one of the parties to the dispute, to the exclusion of the
other.
Malice in Illinois
In contrast to the courts in Massachusetts, Illinois courts re-
lied on malice as an integral part of legal argument in labor cases
for at least 30 years after Justice Holmes' attack on this sort of
usage had become standard.17  The groundwork for the confusion
that would be created by the introduction of malice was firmly laid
in Doremus v. Hennessy, 7 a case frequently quoted in subsequent
labor cases,17 3 although it actually involved business competi-
tion.1 74 Doremus contains the following oft-quoted passage:
169 See 229 Mass. at 420-21, 118 N.E. at 673; Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 35-38. Hohfeld
observed: "The only correlatives logically implied by ... privileges or liberties... are the
'no-rights' of 'third parties.' It would therefore be a non-sequitur to conclude from the mere
existence of such liberties that 'third parties' are under a duty not to interfere ......
Hohfeld, supra note 28, at 36-37. A privilege may exist without any concomitant rights
against third parties. Id. at 36. The existence of such rights is "a question of justice and
policy." Id.
170 See 229 Mass. at 418, 118 N.E. at 672-74. The phrase "right to a free flow of labor"
appeared in a Massachusetts decision at least as late as 1947, when the court in Boylston
Hous. Corp. v. O'Toole, 321 Mass. 538, 549, 74 N.E.2d 288, 296 (1947), went into some detail
in describing that right as the right of a "prospective employer. . . to be free from unlawful
interference with the employment of workmen who wish to enter such employment," id. at
549-50, 74 N.E.2d at 296.
'" See Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 581, 78 N.E. 753, 756-59 (1906) (drawing a
distinction between lawful and unlawful acts committed in furtherance of competition);
Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 356-57, 74 N.E. 603, 604-05 (employing Holmes' analysis
to hold a closed shop contract unlawful), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905). See gener-
ally C. GREGORY, supra note 19, at 60-76 (discussing impact of Holmes' Vegelahn dissent on
subsequent Massachusetts cases).
172 176 Il. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898).
173 See, e.g., A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 In. 424,
432, 83 N.E. 940, 943 (1908); Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 380, 77 N.E. 176,
185 (1906); O'Brien v. People, 216 IlM. 354, 372, 75 N.E. 108, 115 (1905).
174 176 Ill. at 611-12, 52 N.E. at 925. The plaintiff-laundry owner refused to charge her
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Malice, as here used, does not merely mean an intent to harm,
but means an intent to do a wrongful harm and injury. An intent
to do a wrongful harm and injury is unlawful, and if a wrongful
act is done, to the detriment of the right of another it is mali-
cious, and an act maliciously done, with the intent and purpose of
injuring another, is not lawful competition. 175
A dissenting opinion written 5 years later in London Guaran-
tee & Accident Co. v. Horn17 6 reveals the confusion created by this
tautological concept of malice. 17.7 Dissenting, Justices Wilkins and
Cartwright combined the legal and factual meanings of malice to
argue that the issue of malice was irrelevant to the case since mal-
ice can be found only where there is an independently "wrongful
act," and in London Guarantee, there was no "wrongful act.
1 78
The dissenters argued that the insurance company had an ab-
solute right to cancel an insurance policy at any time and for any
reason, and hence that its threat to do so could not be wrongful
even if malicious. 1 7  Ignoring the archaism of the idea of "absolute
right"1 80 for the moment, there are other problems with the dis-
sent's position. A finding of factual malice generally is relevant
even where the defendant has a "right"; at a minimum, it cannot
customers the prices fixed by the Chicago Laundryman's Association, and the defendants
responded by forcing the operators of the laundry plants that were doing the plaintiff's work
to stop servicing the plaintiff. Id. The operators of these laundry plants broke their con-
tracts with the plaintiff, thus destroying her business. Id.
175 Id. at 615, 52 N.E. at 926.
176 206 Ill. 493, 508, 69 N.E. 526, 531 (1903) (Wilkin & Cartwright, JJ., dissenting).
177 See id. at 509-12, 69 N.E. at 531-32 (Wilkin & Cartwright, JJ., dissenting). The
plaintiff, a foreman at a bicycle factory operated by Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (Schwinn), was
injured at work while attempting to operate a milling machine. Id. at 497, 69 N.E. at 527.
Schwinn carried an indemnity policy with the defendant which provided for the indemnifi-
cation of Schwinn against loss arising from injury to its employees. Id. The policy could be
canceled by the defendant at any time if proper notice was given. Id. When the plaintiff
refused the defendant's settlement offer, the agent threatened the manager of the bicycle
factory with immediate cancellation of the indemnity policy unless the plaintiff was fired.
Id. at 495-96, 69 N.E. at 527. The plaintiff accordingly was discharged. Id.
178 Id. at 509, 69 N.E. at 532 (Wilkin & Cartwright, JJ., dissenting).
270 Id. at 509, 69 N.E. at 532 (Wilkin & Cartwright, JJ., dissenting). The majority ac-
knowledged that one may threaten to terminate a contract between himself and another in
the exercise of a lawful right, and that a discharged employee has no cause of action against
the party making the threat even though that party had a malicious motive. Id. at 499-502,
69 N.E. at 528-29. However, the Illinois court required that the party who secured the dis-
charge of the employee be in competition with that employee in the same trade or organiza-
tion. Id. at 502-03, 69 N.E. at 529-30. Notably, the court created this rule by referring to
principles of competition inherent in free business, and then failed to justify it. See id.
180 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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be assumed that an act which normally is lawful remains so when
performed with actual, factual malice. A finding of legal malice,
however, can almost never be irrelevant, although it can be' wrong.
Since such a finding amounts to a legal conclusion that the injuri-
ous act was performed without legal justification, arguments con-
cerning legal malice are always relevant to the question posed in
London Guarantee of whether a defendant's injurious acts were
justified. The confusion created by the Doremus court's treatment
of malice allowed the dissenters in London Guarantee to focus on
the question of malice and bypass their actual quarrel with the
majority as to whether the acts of the insurance company were
justified.
The irony of the dissent's position in London Guarantee is ap-
parent in a subsequent opinion authored by Justice Cartwright. In
A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16,181 Jus-
tice Cartwright, reaffirming the Illinois rule that picketing was ille-
gal per se,182 stated:
In the case of Mathews... the right of an employer whose work-
men have gone upon a strike to contract with other laborers to fill
their places was declared to be an absolute legal right .... It
follows that any interference with that right, whether by threats
or intimidation, or by persuasion, accompanied by actual malice,
is a legal wrong.183
Justice Cartwright's introduction of "actual malice" is confus-
ing, as is his loose use of the term "absolute right." If the em-
ployer's right to contract with new workers to replace those on
strike were truly absolute, the union's motive in interfering with
that right would be irrelevant and any interference would be ille-
gal.'" Similarly, the dissenting opinion in London Guarantee ap-
181 232 Ill. 424, 83 N.E. 940 (1908).
182 The first case that appeared to state a rule that picketing was illegal per se was
Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 11M 355, 380, 77 N.E. 176, 185 (1906). In Franklin, the
court referred to Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 520, 77 N.W.
13, 22 (1898), which explicitly held that picketing was illegal per se in Michigan, id. The
court also cited Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (1896), which
held that picketing outside the plaintiffs place of business constituted interference. 220 Ill.
at 380, 77 N.E. at 185. But cf. Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union, 358 M1. 239, 246-47,
193 N.E. 112, 117 (1934) (peaceful picketing never held unlawful per se in Illinois).
18 Barnes, 232 M11. at 433, 83 N.E. at 943-44 (emphasis added). For a brief discussion of
the Mathews case, see supra note 122.
18 An absolute right is an enforceable claim to another's performance or forbearance.
Legal Analysis, supra note 40, at 476. The necessary correlative of an absolute right is the
general duty of everyone not to prevent the exercise of that right. Id. It generally is recog-
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peared to state that even if the union were acting within its rights
when it formed the picket line, its motive would have been irrele-
vant.18 5 Indeed, the London Guarantee dissent would have entirely
eliminated malice from consideration, since a well-meaning de-
fendant may not interfere with the superior rights of a plaintiff,
and Justice Cartwright in effect advocated that even an ill-inten-
tioned defendant may interfere with a plaintiff's inferior rights.
However, such an analysis requires a reasoned determination of
why certain rights should prevail, a determination that Justice
Cartwright neatly side-stepped by introducing the artificial "fac-
tual" malice finding.18 That the finding was artificial is apparent
from the fact that the case was cited thereafter for the proposition
that unions do not have a general right to picket, regardless of
their motivation.
In Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Association,s7 one of
the many cases that followed the Chicago carpenters' strike, the
concepts of legal and factual malice once again were confused. s1 8
Carlson involved an action against a contractors' association
brought by two plaintiffs, one a union carpenter who was laid off
because of the defendant's refusal to sell materials to anyone who
employed union labor, and one who was forced to stop building a
house because he employed union labor. s18  The appellate court
held for the plaintiffs in a decision containing a long and convo-
luted discussion of the "primary purpose" of the defendants' ac-
tions, progressing in a hopeless tangle from the defendants' malice
to their economic interest to what constitutes permissible legal in-
terests and back again to malice. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme
nized that interference with such a right, even for a lawful purpose, results in liability on the
part of the person interfering. See Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 563-64 (1871) (one who
violates universal right to employ workers is liable for damages even though acts were com-
mitted for lawful purpose).
185 See London Guarantee, 206 IMI. at 508-12, 69 N.E. at 531-33 (Wilkin & Cartwright,
JJ., dissenting).
I Id. (Wilkin & Cartwright, JJ., dissenting).
:97 305 i. 331, 137 N.E. 222 (1922).
88 See supra note 126.
180 As a result of the Carpenters' Union boycott, the construction industry virtually was
shut down. Carlson, 305 IM. at 333, 137 N.E. at 223. The only businesses remaining in opera-
tion were those willing to pay union scale. Id. at 332, 137 N.E. at 222. In response, the
largest employers "locked out" all union members. Id. To make the lockout effective, the
employers persuaded suppliers of building materials to boycott anyone employing union la-
bor. Id. at 333, 137 N.E. at 223. Many small employers and independent contractors, such as
the plaintiff, who were willing to pay union wages, were forced to halt their building
projects. Id. With construction at a standstill, many union members lost their jobs. Id.
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Court attempted to clarify the lower court's rationale by stating
that a court's primary consideration should be the nature of the
plaintiff's rights rather than the rights or motives of the defen-
dants. 190 The supreme court's rationale was similar to that of Jus-
tice Cartwright in Barnes:
These rights [to dispose of one's own labor and to invest capital
as one pleases] being clear, any one who invades them without
lawful cause or justification commits a legal wrong .... Damage
inflicted by the use of intimidation, obstruction, or molestation
with malice is without excuse .... No persons . . . have the
right to directly or indirectly interfere with or disturb another in
his lawful business or occupation or for the sake of compelling
him to do some act which in his own judgment his own interest
does not require. Losses willfully caused by another from motives
of malice to one who seeks to exercise and enjoy the fruits and
advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill, or credit will
sustain an action. 191
The introduction of the concept of malice in Carlson served no ju-
dicial purpose. The court simply obscured its initial discussion of
justification for invading legal rights by examining motivation and
malice. Certainly, the court failed to heed its own admonition that
focusing primarily on the defendant will only confuse the determi-
nation of the issues.
Not only is the introduction of the term malice into the Carl-
son opinion inconsistent with the court's own argument, but it is
unclear whether the court is discussing legal or factual malice. If
the court intended legal malice, the argument is tautological; if it
intended factual malice, the argument is unsupported by the facts.
This confusion, however, may have served a purpose. A finding of
malice at law, when applied to a novel fact pattern, requires an
explicit holding on the scope of the defendant's rights; a finding of
factual malice does not. Holdings that relied on an unsupported
finding of factual malice while equating it with legal malice may
have represented a compromise position. Such a holding saved the
Carlson court from declaring that the defendants had a general
"no-right" without specifying exactly what their general rights
were.192 The requirement of factual malice, combined with an un-
Id. at 335, 137 N.E. at 224; see Barnes, 232 Ill. at 433, 83 N.E. at 945.
191 Carlson, 305 IM. at 338, 137 N.E. at 224 (emphasis added).
192 Compare Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 498, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (advocating shift to consideration of defendant's rights) with L.D. Willcutt &
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clear reference to legal malice, left open the question of the exact
scope of the defendants' rights. This seems to be a particularly
plausible explanation of the court's action in Carlson, where the
employer was the party found to be malicious; the finding of fac-
tual malice helped the court avoid a decision that would have lim-
ited employers' general rights while admitting that this employer
had simply gone too far. It is, thus, a good example of the use of a
factual malice finding as a middle ground between rights and no-
rights.
This discussion of malice was, however, the last one of this
form to be found in Illinois. In a later case arising out of the same
strike, Justice Cartwright himself recognized that factual malice
seldom is an important factor in untangling the legal rights and
wrongs involved in a labor dispute. Justice Cartwright wrote in An-
derson & Lind Manufacturing Co. v. Carpenters' District
Council:19
The substantial argument is that the defendants had a right to do
anything they saw fit for the purpose of strengthening or protect-
ing the labor union at large ....
... If an evil motive does not make a lawful act unlawful, it
is equally true that what may be regarded as a good motive will
not make an unlawful act lawful.""
In examining the application of the concept of malice in these
cases, it appears that there was some third meaning attributed to
the concept of malice-not apparent on the surface-other than
the colloquial or legal, which might have saved it from circularity,
at least in the judges' minds. As stated before, malice primarily
was used to mediate the rights attributed to both sides in labor
disputes which might otherwise have seemed to be blatantly politi-
cal conflicts.19 5 There appears, however, to be more to malice than
this rather instrumental function. The passion with which the
judges appealed to findings of malice makes it difficult to believe
that they did not believe it to have a real meaning. One explana-
tion may be that malice represented a metaphor for actions which
ran counter to the judiciary's construct of "good" industrial behav-
Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent & Protective Union No. 3, 200 Mass. 110, 113-14, 85
N.E. 897, 899 (1908) (union has right to strike by lawful means for higher wages and shorter
hours).
193 308 Ill. 488, 139 N.E. 887 (1923).
1:4 Id. at 497, 139 N.E. at 890.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
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ior.19e The actions of unions or "bad" employers were not in them-
selves malicious or purely spiteful, but they were like acts of mal-
ice in that they attacked "good" industrial relations. In other
words, picketing was equated with the malicious destruction of
someone's business because such labor activities did not coincide
with the judiciary's personal visions of how industrial society
should operate. However, the judges could keep their personal vi-
sions private by use of the word "malice." The word malice, as at-
tributed to the losing party, put him in the category of clear evil-
doers without requiring the judges to recognize that malice must
be directed at something.
INDEFENSIBLE DISTINCTIONS
More common than the utilization of blatantly circular logic
was the establishment of an apparent but misleading factual line
to distinguish between the types of actions that frequently oc-
curred in the labor cases. The courts labeled actions on one side of
the line "legal" and those on the other side "illegal. ' 197 This pro-
cess seems like a paradigm of legal decisionmaking, and indeed
these cases are not as superficially confusing as are the malice or
rights cases discussed above. The problem was that the lines drawn
were and are difficult to justify substantively,19 8 and impossible to
apply with any consistency to the many different factual situations
that gave rise to suits.19 9 As the courts faced increasingly complex
fact patterns, the distinctions that once seemed clear tended to
evolve into conclusory formulas. The distinctions stated an intelli-
gible, if often unjustified, rule. Since these rules lack justification,
I" See Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 308 Il. 488, 497, 139
N.E. 887, 890 (1923) (use of coercion by threatening loss of business is not tolerable behav-
ior); see also Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Comm. to Enforce Landis Award, 333 111. 225,
240, 164 N.E. 393, 401 (1928) (actions of a committee comprised of businessmen not in-
volved in dispute is improper interference).
I" See, e.g., Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 nM 213, 230-31, 99 N.E. 389, 396 (1912)
(lawful primary object of union solidarity achieved by proposed strike compelling discharge
of non-union employees as opposed to illegal strike solely to injure third parties); Berry v.
Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 356-57, 74 N.E. 603, 605-06 (unlawful strike for indirect benefit of
strengthening union for future controversies differs from legal strike to obtain direct, legal
benefits of improved working conditions), appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905).
"' See N. FALcoNrE, supra note 139, at 45.
'"See, e.g., E. WrrrE, supra note 78, at 20-21. Compare Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass.
572, 583, 78 N.E. 753, 758-59 (1906) (union may strike to obtain work normally given to
another union) with Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 338, 94 N.E. 316, 317 (1911) (unlawful
for union to strike to obtain monopoly of labor market).
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however, the decisions relying on them became unintelligible. Each
factual situation appeared to generate its own rules, a situation
that renders meaningless the very concept of ordered rules. Indeed,
with no principled way to delimit the "rules," they became state-
ments of legal conclusion masquerading as findings of fact, just as
the malice rule had always been.
Massachusetts: The Direct-Indirect Distinction
In Berry v. Donovan,200 the Massachusetts court first estab-
lished the rule that certain union actions were permissible if in-
tended directly to achieve "legal" aims such as shorter hours, bet-
ter working conditions and higher wages, but impermissible if they
would lead only indirectly to the achievement of these aims.20 1 The
decision was remarkable for its forthright acknowledgement of po-
litical concerns. The court observed:
It is no legal objection to action whose direct effect is helpful to
one of the parties in the struggle that it is also directly detrimen-
tal to the other. But when [an] action is directed against the
other, primarily for the purpose of doing him harm and thus com-
pelling him to yield to the demand of the actor, and this action
does not directly affect the property, or business, or status of the
actor, the case is different, even if the actor expects to derive a
remote or indirect benefit from the act.
The gain which a labor union may expect to derive from in-
ducing others to join it, is not an improvement to be obtained
directly in the conditions under which the men are working, but
only added strength for such contests with [the] employers as
may arise in the future. An object of this kind is too remote to be
considered a benefit in business, such as to justify the infliction of
intentional injury upon a third person for the purpose of ob-
taining it. If such an object were treated as legitimate, and al-
lowed to be pursued to its complete accomplishment, every em-
ployee would be forced into membership in a union, and the
unions, by a combination of those in different trades and occupa-
tions, would have complete and absolute control of all the indus-
tries of the country .... The attempt to force all laborers to
combine in unions is against the policy of the law, because it aims
at monopoly. It therefore does not justify causing the discharge,
20 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905).
201 Id. at 357-58, 74 N.E. at 605-06. For an overview of the facts in Berry and an analy-
sis of the Massachusetts court's treatment of the rights involved, see supra notes 87-95 and
accompanying text.
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by his employer, of an individual laborer working under a
contract. 2
The court's ultimate holding was clear; the "directness" of benefit
to the union was the standard against which harmful union actions
were to be judged. The Berry holding is consistent with the some-
what elliptical treatment of the issue of direct and indirect benefits
in the earlier case of Plant v. Woods, in which strikes to achieve a
closed shop were declared illegal.203 While the terms "direct" and
"indirect" were not used in that decision, the concepts were im-
plicit both in the majority opinion2°' and even more so in Justice
Holmes' dissent:20 5
To come directly to the point, the issue is narrowed to the ques-
tion whether, assuming that some purposes would be a justifica-
tion, the purpose in this case of the threatened boycotts and
strikes was such as to justify the threats....
I differ from my Brethren in thinking that the threats were
as lawful for this ... purpose as for the final one to which
strengthening the union was a means.2 06
In Folsom v. Lewis, 07 the next major case in which the Massa-
chusetts court utilized the direct-indirect distinction, the court
treated the standard promulgated in Berry as an established
rule.20 8 Like Plant, Folsom involved a strike to impose a closed
shop.2 09 The court stated simply.
188 Mass. at 358-59, 74 N.E. at 605-06.
'" Plant, 176 Mass. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015. For a brief summary of the facts in Plant
and an examination of the Massachusetts court's treatment of the parties' rights, see supra
notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
204 176 Mass. at 498-99, 57 N.E. at 1013. The majority stated that the right of labor to
compete for maximization of job benefits is protected and that injury to any party resulting
from this competition "is damnum absque injuria. . . ." Id. at 498, 57 N.E. at 1013. (em-
phasis added). Nevertheless, the court found that injury that results outside the gamut of
lawful competition would not be condoned. Id. The court held that the union's objective was
to gain a general advantage rather than a specific improvement in wages, hours, or working
conditions, and that such an objective was unlawful. Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015.
201 Id. at 504, 57 N.E. at 1015 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Justice
Holmes agreed with the majority that the union's objective was "not directly concerned with
wages" but was "one degree more remote." Id. at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dis-
senting). He argued, however, that such conduct was justified as preliminary to the attain-
ment of the direct goals of the union. Id. at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
28 Id. (Holmes, C.J., dissenting).
20 208 Mass. 336, 94 N.E. 316 (1911).
2- Id. at 338, 94 N.E. at 317.
0 Id. at 337-38, 94 N.E. at 316-17.
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Conduct directly affecting an employer to his detriment, by inter-
ference with his business, is not justifiable in law, unless it is of a
kind and for a purpose that has a direct relation to benefits that
the laborers are trying to obtain. Strengthening the forces of a
labor union. . . is not enough to justify an attack upon the busi-
ness of an employer by inducing his [employees] to strike.2 10
The courts in Folsom and Berry drew a genuine distinction
between purposes that are adequate to justify the defendants' ac-
tions and those that are not.2 11 There were, however, at least two
problems with the line drawn. First, as Justice Holmes noted in his
Plant dissent, there appears to be no apolitical reason for the dis-
tinction.2 12 Second, the distinction that seemed clear in the para-
digmatic polar cases of a strike by current employees to better
their working conditions and a strike to impose a closed shop could
not be applied cleanly in the increasingly complicated cases that
the courts began to encounter as unions became more successful.2 13
Intended as a clear factual standard, it became just another
formula for stating the court's conclusion. To apply the distinction,
the court either had to deal with the very political questions that
the distinction was intended to circumvent, in essence, to turn it
into a "fact" like "malice," or simply to state flatly that it was the
rule and affirm it as if it were self-executing, not indeterminate.214
In concrete terms, the directness test failed to establish any objec-
tive or apolitical standard for deciding labor dispute cases because,
except in the paradigm cases, the judgment as to what types of
benefits were "direct" rested on exactly the same grounds as the
ultimate judgment as to whether the union had acted legally.2 15
210 Id. at 338, 94 N.E. at 317.
"I See id.; Berry, 188 Mass. at 358-59, 74 N.E. at 605-06.
312 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900) (Holmes, C.J., dis-
senting), see also Warm, A Study of the Judicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions and La-
bor Legislation, 23 MINN. L. Ray. 255, 265-66 (1939) (noting that courts use social and eco-
nomic factors to determine justification in labor cases); Wyman, The Maintenance of the
Open Shop, 17 GRFMN BAG 21, 26-27 (1905) (political considerations discussed in light of
Plant).
2'1 See, e.g., infra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., Fairbanks v. McDonald, 219 Mass. 291, 297, 106 N.E. 1000, 1001 (1914)
(union actions declared malicious at law); see also United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Fitzgerald,
237 Mass. 537, 541, 130 N.E. 86, 88 (1921) (union interference with employer's "yellow dog"
contracts held unjustified); Ames, How Far an Act May be a Tort Because of the Wrongful
Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REv. 411, 418 (1905) (motive of employees who strike is a
factor in determining legality of strike).
21i See, e.g., Minasian v. Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 251-52, 96 N.E. 1036, 1038 (1911);
L.D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent & Protective Union No. 3, 200 Mass.
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What was intended to be a preliminary factual finding was trans-
formed into a legal conclusion.
Two decisions in 1914 illustrate this dilemma. In Hoban v.
Dempsey,28 a longshoremen's union unsuccessfully challenged a
contract between another union and a number of shippers.1 7 The
contract required the companies to employ only members of the
defendant union unless the union could not provide enough work-
ers. 218 Writing for the court, Justice Rugg reasoned that the case
fell within the ambit of Pickett v. Walsh,1 e in which the court had
held that a union could lawfully strike in order to require all work
on a given job to be done by union members.220 Justice Rugg dis-
tinguished Folsom, which he cited for the broad proposition that
"strike[s] or other compulsion to procure a closed shop" were ille-
gal.221 This conjunction of cases destroyed the factual distinction
stated so firmly in Folsom. The benefits of enforcing a closed shop
agreement on particular jobs, such as in Pickett, or on all future
jobs, as in Hoban, are no more "direct" for the union workers than
those of striking to attain a general closed shop agreement such as
that in Folsom. It is worth noting that the court could have, but
did not, make a legitimate factual distinction in the manner of the
Berry decision between the Pickett defendants, who were attempt-
ing to monopolize existing particular projects, and the Hoban de-
fendants, who would appear to wish to monopolize an entire labor
market. Indeed, this sort of distinction may have been contem-
plated by the courts in some later cases which seemed to reject the
precedents of Pickett and Hoban.222 The court, however, failed to
110, 113-14, 85 N.E. 897, 899, 901 (1908).
216 217 Mass. 166, 104 N.E. 717 (1914).
217 Id. at 168, 104 N.E. at 717-18.
2IB Id. at 168, 104 N.E. at 717. The plaintiff union in Hoban complained that the con-
tract between the defendant union and shippers would adversely affect its ability to secure
employment with shippers. Id. at 168, 104 N.E. at 718.
S1 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906).
220 Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 168, 104 N.E. 717, 718 (1914). In Pickett, mem-
bers of the defendant unions had been hired by a general contractor to lay bricks and
stones. 192 Mass. at 575, 78 N.E. at 755. The unions adopted a rule stating that union
members would refuse to do any more bricklaying and masonry if the additional job of
"pointing" the brick and stone was not given exclusively to union members. Id. at 576, 78
N.E. at 755. The general contractor and pointers who were members of neither the brick-
layer's nor the mason's union brought an action seeking to enjoin the union from imple-
menting a strike and causing non-union pointers to lose their jobs. Id.
" 217 Mass. at 171, 104 N.E. at 719; see Folsom, 208 Mass. at 338, 94 N.E. at 317.
2 See, e.g., Fairbanks v. McDonald, 219 Mass. 291, 297, 106 N.E. 1000, 1001 (1914);
infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
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identify the decisive factual distinctions among these cases, seem-
ing to pull its characterizations of various acts as either direct-legal
or indirect-illegal out of thin air. In each instance, work may be
diverted from non-union to union workers, employers may be con-
strained in who they may hire and how much they pay to get a
particular job done, thereby enhancing the ability of the organized
workers to assert their demands for lawful benefits.2 2 Justice
Rugg's reliance on Pickett and Folsom illustrates the indetermi-
nacy of the directness test. The actions undertaken in Pickett and
Hoban were declared to be for "direct" benefits simply because
they did not fit cleanly into the model of strikes for "indirect" ben-
efits posited in Berry and Folsom.224
Justice Rugg attempted to distinguish Berry from Hoban by
asserting that Berry turned on the fact that the plaintiff had been
discharged.225 This distinction, however, is a misreading of Berry,
since that case did not hinge on the plaintiff's discharge.226 The
crux of Berry was not the immediacy of the harm to plaintiff, but
rather the nature of the benefit to the defendant.227
The court made two further related attempts to explain the
Hoban decision. After setting forth the facts of the dispute, the
court observed:
The uncontradicted direct testimony was to the effect that the
dominant motive on the part of both parties was to gain benefits
for themselves and in no sense to harm the plaintiffs.. . . [I]t is
plain from [the] summary of testimony that the finding that there
was no purpose to injure the plaintiffs or to compel them to join
the defendant union was supported by [the] evidence.22
Citing the Folsom decision with approval, Justice Rugg concluded
223 See F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, JR., LABOR ECONOMIcs: WAGES, EMPLOY-
MENT, AND TRADE UN'IONISM 357 (1980); L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELA-
TIONS 465-69 (1978); Warm, supra note 212, at 287-95; Note, Right of Labor Unions to
Strike for the Enforcement of the Closed Shop, 13 COLUm. L. REv. 66, 68 (1913).
224 See Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 358-59, 74 N.E. 603, 605-06, appeal dismissed,
199 U.S. 612 (1905). The Berry court labeled as indirect the benefits gained through action
directed against another party "primarily for the purpose of doing him harm, and thus com-
pelling him to yield" to the union. Id. at 358, 74 N.E. at 605. While the union activities in
Hoban and Pickett arguably were undertaken to attain the indirect benefit of strengthening
the unions, the court apparently refused to label the activities indirect because they were
not intended primarily to harm the employers.
125 Hoban, 217 Mass. at 170, 104 N.E. at 719.
220 Berry, 188 Mass. at 359-60, 74 N.E. at 606.
227 Id. at 358-59, 74 N.E. at 605-06.
2 Hoban, 217 Mass. at 169, 104 N.E. at 718.
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that "a different situation is presented by a voluntary and un-
forced agreement, freely made solely for the mutual advantage of
the contracting parties, which does not effect the discharge from
employment of anyone. '229
The first quotation illustrates the commonly confused inter-
play between the directness test and malice, and the second con-
nects the directness test with cases dealing with the natural laws of
business and the free flow of labor. Both show ways in which the
simple "factual" directness test became unmoored from its factual
roots in complex cases, as extraneous arguments were brought in to
bolster decisions that rested on uncertain grounds. In Hoban, in
fact, the testimony of the steamship company defendants made it
clear that their reason for contracting with one union was their
fear of continued labor unrest which they had experienced in the
past when they dealt with several other unions, and hence, their
actions were "compelled" by much the same fears that compel the
settlement of a strike. "Compulsion" was not the key to Folsom
any more than discharge was the key to Berry. Further, defend-
ant's motives should have played no part in determining whether
actions were direct-legal or indirect-illegal. Each of Justice Rugg's
explanations for the court's Hoban decision took it farther from
the very standard on which it supposedly rested.
Later that year, the court in Fairbanks v. McDonald230 distin-
guished Pickett and Hoban, relying heavily on the directness
test.231 The court, finding for the plaintiffs, who had been dis-
charged at the union's behest, 232 wrote:
[The defendants] intended to compel the plaintiffs' employers to
discharge the plaintiffs and to refuse to give to the plaintiffs any
further employment, and that this was done, not for the purpose
of securing for the members of the defendants' union all the work
that was to be had from these employers, but to deprive the
plaintiffs of employment and make it impossible for them to ob-
tain their livelihood by their labor, unless they should become
members of the defendants' union upon whatever onerous terms
229 Id. at 171, 104 N.E. at 719.
:20 219 Mass. 291, 106 N.E. 1000 (1914).
231 Id. at 297, 106 N.E. at 1001. The court classified as allowable competition a union's
demand for either all or none of the work, such as occurred in Pickett and Hoban, while
finding the union activity in Fairbanks to be a direct, malicious attack on the plaintiffs. Id.
232 Id. at 297, 106 N.E. at 1000. The plaintiffs-members of a local union-sought to
restrain the defendants, a rival union affiliated with a national union, from forcing an em-
ployer to discharge the plaintiffs. Id.
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the latter should choose to impose....
The defendants did not say to their employers, "You must
give us all your work or none of it," as they might have done
without exceeding the limits of allowable competition. They re-
quired their employers to refuse absolutely to employ the plain-
tiffs, for the purpose of putting upon the latter an unfair
pressure.2 33
Since it was settled in Massachusetts that certain types of action
in support of closed shops were legal, 3 4 so long as they did not fit
into the paradigm of a strike for a closed shop,23 5 the court was
compelled to make a further distinction between permissible types
of actions that were "directly" for a closed shop, and ones that
worked to that end only indirectly through applying pressure on
recalcitrant workers to join the union.236
The genesis of the directness test in Berry was the political
judgment that certain actions made unions too strong to be toler-
233 Id. at 297, 106 N.E. at 1000-01 (citations omitted).
"I See, e.g., Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 169, 104 N.E. 717, 718 (1914) (union
may enter into mutually beneficial contract with an employer where only injury suffered is
the competitive loss suffered by rival union); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 584, 78 N.E.
753, 758 (1906) (union has a right to compete against rival unions for work by engaging in a
strike or by threatening to strike); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 362, 74 N.E. 603, 607
(conceding that in some instances action designed to create a closed shop may be justified),
appeal dismissed, 199 U.S. 612 (1905).
I" See Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 337, 94 N.E. 316, 317 (1911) (industry wide
strike for closed shop is unlawful); see also Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385,
388, 48 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1943) (outsider strike for closed shop in which employees played no
part is unlawful).
2' Fairbanks v. McDonald, 219 Mass. 291, 297, 106 N.E. 1000, 1001 (1914). Another
case that distinguishes Pickett by using a direct-indirect analysis is Haverhill Strand Thea-
ter, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671 (1918), wherein the court held that a strike to
force an employer to hire a minimum number of workers was illegal:
[I]n [Pickett] the contractor wanted the pointing done. The peculiarity of the case
at bar is that the work which the defendants have combined to force the plaintiff
to give to them is work which the plaintiff does not want done; not only that, but
it is work which if done at the plaintiff's expense will cause him pecuniary
loss .... The question is whether a combination by a union for the purpose of
getting work for the members of it in this indirect way is a justifiable interference
with the plaintiff's right to a free flow of labor.
Id. at 419, 118 N.E. at 673-74 (emphasis added). Though the union's conduct differed from
that of the union in Pickett, the substantive issue in both was the same: Can an employer be
forced to pay more money than he wishes in order to have a given job done? Id. It is not
clear what the court meant by the union "getting work for the members ... in this indirect
way," id. at 419-20, 118 N.E. at 674, since there was nothing indirect about what the union
did in Haverhill. The term "indirect" was detached from both its normal meaning and from
its original legal usage; the "factual" standard had actually become purely a legal con-
clusion.
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ated, and that one could distinguish factually those powerful indi-
rect actions from permissible and less threatening direct ones. As
the foregoing discussion illustrates, however, subsequent courts
reasoned backwards from the conclusion that disputed actions
were too effective to the argument that they were "indirect," and
then moved forward again to the very conclusion with which their
analysis had begun.
Trade Disputes in Massachusetts
In 1913, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the Peaceful
Persuasion Act (The Massachusetts Act),2 7 which deprived the
Massachusetts courts of the power to issue injunctions against cer-
tain kinds of action in cases involving "trade disputes. '238 The
Massachusetts Act, however, failed to define "trade disputes. '239
As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court, in a series of cases, held
that the Massachusetts Act did not change the common-law rule
that only strikes arising out of a dispute between an employer and
his own workers concerning the wages, hours, and conditions of
work were protected. 240 Thus, the directness test continued to play
a major role in Massachusetts labor law even after passage of the
New Deal legislation. For example, in Simon v. Schwachman,2 "
the court issued an injunction against peaceful picketing by a meat
cutters union of a retail meat dealer who employed non-union la-
bor at wages below union scale.242 The court wrote:
In this case the acts of the defendants are not justifiable
237 MAss. GE. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 24 (West 1982). The Massachusetts Act was
modeled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
SU See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 24 (West 1982).
" See id.
See, e.g., Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 388, 48 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1943)
(non-employee union strike to attain closed shop unlawful); Quinton's Market, Inc. v. Pat-
terson, 303 Mass. 315, 317, 21 N.E.2d 546, 548-49 (1939) (injunction barring non-employee
union picketing concerning working hours); Simon v. Schwachman, 301 Mass. 573, 579, 18
N.E.2d 1, 4 (1938) (picketing for union recognition and closed shop by non-employee union
unlawful).
1 301 Mass. 573, 18 N.E.2d 1 (1938).
-2 Id. at 574, 18 N.E.2d at 6. In Simon, the union sought a contract that would have
instituted a closed shop, increased employee wages, and shortened working hours. Id. at 570,
18 N.E.2d at 2-3. The picketing was done during business hours, but with only one picket at
a time, and without banner, sign or placard. Id. at 575, 18 N.E.2d at 3. There were no
disturbances, threats, or coercive acts, but the pickets recited slogans stating that the store
treated labor unfairly and advocated boycotting the store. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the
picketing was damaging to its business. Id.
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under the common law of this Commonwealth even with the
peaceful persuasion act added, because there is no lawful trade
dispute recognized by that law. By our common law, the right to
strike and maintain pickets against an employer is deemed the
right of his employees only....
... The statute omits to change the substantive law of torts
243
The next year, in Quinton's Market, Inc., v. Patterson,244 the
court granted an injunction against a union that was picketing to
force a non-union employer to observe Wednesday as a half-
holiday.
It is . . .settled that in order to justify the infliction of inten-
tional injury and to escape the liability which follows from the
ordinarily tortious quality of such an act, the right of their own
which the defendants claim to exercise must bear a direct, and
not a merely remote or secondary, relation to their own lawful
advantage....
... No sound argument can be made that the words "lawful
trade dispute" as they appear in the amended section were in-
tended to include disputes that at common law could not lawfully
become the subject of combination or to change the established
rule that the statute applied only where there was an existing
"lawful" dispute.2 45
Thus, it is possible to trace the development of the directness
test from its sociological jurisprudence-influenced roots in Berry in
1905, through its progressive "legalization" in the 1910's, to its
eventual formalization by the 1930's. What had begun as a politi-
245 Id. at 577, 579, 18 N.E.2d at 4-5. Tying the concept of direct benefits to the term
trade dispute was not unique to the 1930's. It had appeared at least as early as 1914, in
Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N.E. 841 (1914), which involved a classic secondary
boycott. The crux of the court's decision was its statement that "[t]he defendants have no
real trade dispute with the plaintiffs. No one of the members of the union is... employed
by the plaintiffs." Id. at 356, 104 N.E. at 843. Similarly, the court in Martineau v. Foley, 225
Mass. 107, 113 N.E. 1038 (1916), stated:
There is nothing in the allegations to the effect that the plaintiffs were in
dispute with employ~s or with the [defendant] union, and so far as may be in-
ferred, the action of the defendants as members of their union, was taken with a
purpose to cause damage to the plaintiffs because of their relation to unionism,
with the motive to thereby strengthen the local union and place it in better posi-
tion to assert its demands for a union shop.
Id. at 109, 113 N.E. at 1039.
244 303 Mass. 315, 21 N.E.2d 546 (1939).
245 Id. at 317, 319, 21 N.E.2d at 548-49.
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cal/factual standard has become an abstract legal one, used to
counteract legislation seemingly designed explicitly to change the
legal rules.2'
Illinois Courts and Primary Purpose
In Illinois, a concept was developed which was similar to the
Massachusetts "direct/indirect" distinction, although the terms
used were somewhat different. The Illinois courts discussed the
"primary purpose" of union activity, a phrase which neatly com-
bined and confused the arguments about the economic effect of
union actions with arguments regarding their motives. Thus, even
more than in Massachusetts, the Illinois court mixed arguments
about malice with those about direct or indirect benefit to unions
and their members to create an ostensible factual standard which
was, in fact, no standard at all. For example, in A.R. Barnes & Co.
v. Typographical Union No. 16,2,7 the court, holding that picket-
ing in support of an otherwise lawful strike was illegal per se,24 1
began its rationale with a reference to the union's "actual malice,"
and ended by contrasting combinations "for the purpose of ob-
taining lawful benefits" and those "which have for their immediate
purpose the injury of another. '249 The "immediate purpose" lan-
guage suggested that a picket line was comparable to a strike for a
closed shop in that both would directly harm the employer and
2,9 In Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass 385, 48 N.E.2d 1 (1943), the court ob-
served: "Whatever advantage might in general accrue to trade unionism by the acquisition
of a closed shop arrangement with an employer, there is not sufficient relationship between
the aim sought and the self interest of the strikers to justify the intentional infliction of
harm on another." Id. at 388, 48 N.E.2d at 3. Six years later, in Reeves v. Scott, 324 Mass.
594, 87 N.E.2d 833 (1949), the court noted:
The distinction between a demand by a union that an employer give members of
the union all his work in their trades .. . and a demand upon an employer with
whom the union has no trade dispute that he see to it that members of the union
are substituted for nonunion men who are working for one with whom the em-
ployer has business relations . . .is clear ... The first demand is lawful and
enforceable against the employer, but the second is illegal and unjustified, being
directed against a stranger to the controversy to compel him to compel another to
yield to the union's demands.
Id. at 600, 87 N.E.2d at 836. By the time Reeves was decided, the Massachusetts court
appeared to have lost all sense of the underlying political nature of the distinctions being
drawn, and to have appealed to the direct-indirect distinction as one of logic and nature
rather than one of economic and political thrust.
24 232 IlM. 424, 83 N.E. 940 (1908).
248 Id. at 435-36, 83 N.E. at 944-45.
4, Id. at 437, 83 N.E. at 945.
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only ultimately, as opposed to immediately, benefit the workers. 50
Nowhere was the confusion between malice and indirect bene-
fits more apparent than in the Illinois Supreme Court's disposition
of Kemp v. Division No. 241.251 In Kemp, the plaintiffs, former
members of the defendant railway engineers' union, had left the
union in a dispute over the use of union funds for political pur-
poses.2 52 The defendant called a strike to enforce its closed shop
agreement with the employer and succeeded in obtaining the
plaintiffs' discharge.2 53 The appellate court, holding against the
union, observed:
The acts and measures against which relief is sought ...
were an effort to drive complainants from their business, not by
underbidding them, not by doing the same work better or more
cheaply, nor by refusing to work with them for good and sufficient
causes, but were malicious interference and intimidation exerted
on their employer for the purpose of inflicting injury and causing
losses to complainants ....
Nor do we think the acts complained of can be justified on
the plea that they were done for the good of the union or its
members as suggested above .2 M
The appellate court's position was that the benefit for which the
union struck-strengthening the union through a closed shop-was
too remote to provide legal justification for acts interfering with
250 Another explanation for the Illinois court's position is that it confused the issues of
immediate harm to plaintiffs with immediate benefits to defendants, as did the Massachu-
setts court on occasion. In some subsequent cases, the court would more clearly declare a
defendant's actions unlawful because they interfered directly with a plaintiff's rights, when
the real concern was, at least ostensibly, with the attenuation of defendant's benefits. See,
e.g., Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 308 Ill. 488, 139 N.E. 887
(1923). This confusion is related to the misconstruction of malice and the directness test,
since it was easy to consider as malicious a defendant who caused an immediate and easily
identifiable harm.
251 153 M1. App. 344, rev'd, 255 Ill 213, 99 N.E. 389 (1912).
2- 255 Il1. at 215, 99 N.E. at 390.
2- Id. at 216, 99 N.E. at 390-91. The plaintiffs argued that the threatened strike was
unlawful because it involved a union grievance against former union members who were not
in direct competition with the union. Id. at 226, 99 N.E. at 394. The supreme court ulti-
mately agreed that the union's proposed actions were "remote" from a matter of direct com-
petition but concluded that they were still "kindred" to direct competition in that the inter-
nal strengthening of the union itself would enable labor "to make a successful effort to
maintain or increase their wages or to enforce such demands as have been held to be
proper." Id.
1" 153 IM. App. at 375-76.
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the plaintiffs' rights.255
The supreme court rejected the argument that the defendants
had acted with malice toward the plaintiffs and reversed the appel-
late court on the grounds that "the primary object of the combina-
tion [was] to further the interests of the organization and improve
and better the condition of its members. '256 The appellate court
had kept its consideration of malice and primary economic motive
separate, arguing chiefly that the benefit for which the union was
striking-a closed shop-was too remotely related to acceptable
benefits to justify a strike.25 The supreme court's decision, how-
ever, combined its treatment of malice and immediacy of benefits:
If it is proper for workmen to organize themselves into such
combinations as labor unions, it must necessarily follow that it is
proper for them to adopt any proper means to preserve that or-
ganization. If the securing of the closed shop is deemed by the
255 Id. at 376. The appellate court, relying extensively on Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass.
572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906), found that the absence of a trade dispute was fatal to the defend-
ant's claimed right to strike. 153 Ill. App. at 378. The court acknowledged that if the contro-
versy were between employers and employees and involved a genuine trade dispute, the
union would possess a right to strike the employer. Id. In this particular instance, however,
the court held that no trade dispute existed and that interference with the disgruntled em-
ployees' right to work was not permissible. Id. at 379. The court noted that this case fell
outside the parameters of allowable competition, since the purpose of the union's actions in
enforcing the closed shop was not to compete with the plaintiffs, but maliciously to inflict
injury on them. Id. at 374-75. The court regarded the combination of laborers to prevent
employers from employing others as a "despotic and tyrannical" violation of a laborer's in-
defeasible right to choose work freely. Id. at 370. Equally as important, however, was the
court's view that the benefit that would accrue to the union, had its action been successful,
was remote in relation to the immediate and possibly irreparable injury to the resigning
union members. Id. at 376.
2 255 Ill. at 234-35, 99 N.E. at 397. Noting that neither threats nor actual violence had
occurred, the supreme court concluded that there was no evidence of malice toward the
plaintiffs. Id. at 225, 99 N.E. at 394. The court determined, therefore, that the intent to
injure was not the primary object of the union's actions, but rather, the union's goal was to
seek better working conditions by establishing a closed shop. Id. at 225-26, 99 N.E. at 394.
In the opinion of the court, a union effectively can fight for better wages and hours only by
preserving the unity of the organization. Id. at 226, 99 N.E. at 394. Moreover, the court
noted that since laborers, unless otherwise bound by contract, have the constitutional right
to terminate their employment for any reason, organized laborers can vocalize their refusal
to work unless their non-union counterparts will be discharged. Id. at 219-20, 99 N.E. at
392. Thus, the court indicated, those who have incidentally been injured by a union's exer-
cise of this absolute right have no legal redress. Id. at 220, 99 N.E. at 392.
217 153 Ill. App. at 643. The dissenting opinion on the appellate level echoed Justice
Holmes' dissent in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900) (Holmes,
C.J., dissenting), by asking rhetorically "But shall the courts say that the purpose of secur-
ing more remote benefit will not be a justification for acts not in themselves tortious... ?
153 I. App. at 643.
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members of a labor union of the utmost importance and neces-
sary for the preservation of their organization, through which,
alone, they have been enabled to secure better wages and better
working conditions, and if to secure that is the primary object of
the threat to strike, even though in the successful prosecution of
the object of the combination injury may result incidentally to
non-union men through the loss of their positions, that object
does not become unlawful.258
The court, then, found as a matter of fact that the "primary
object" of the strikers was to preserve and strengthen their organi-
zation, and not to injure non-union plaintiffs. Thus far, the deci-
sion was clear, if inadequately explained. The opinion, however,
continued:
This case partakes of none of the elements of a boycott. The pri-
mary object of a boycott being to inflict injury upon another has
universally been held to be illegal. Here the primary object of the
combination is to further the interests of the organization and im-
prove and better the condition of its members. Whatever injury
may follow to others is merely incidental.259
This is blatant nonsense. Harm to the plaintiffs and help to
the union are equally the object of boycotts and strikes for a closed
shop. 2 0 Boycotts were, however, an even less direct way of
strengthening the union than strikes for closed shops, 21 and it ap-
pears that that is what the supreme court had in mind. The court,
however, applied language seemingly concerned with motive to an
analysis more concerned with effects, thereby effectively obscuring
the real grounds for the decision.
In Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Association,26 2 the case
258 255 Ill. at 226-27, 99 N.E. at 394.
259 Id. at 234-35, 99 N.E. at 397. The Illinois court's construct of primary purpose con-
stituted a concept similar to the directness test adopted by the Massachusetts court in
Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603 (1905), under which only union activities
intended directly to achieve legitimate labor objectives, such as more favorable hours, wages
and working conditions, were legally permissible. Although the Illinois court confused the
issue of directness with malice, it closely paralleled the Massachusetts rationale by holding
that actions contributing only indirectly to the attainment of legitimate labor goals would
not be allowed. See, e.g., Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Il. 213, 225-26, 99 N.E. 389, 394
(1912); A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 I1. 424, 431, 83 N.E.
940, 943 (1908).
260 Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 234-35, 99 N.E. 389, 397 (1912).
201 See Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1363,
1364 n.5 (1962) (strike is nothing more than a type of boycott).
262 305 M11. 331, 137 N.E. 222 (1922).
[Vol. 58:1
LEGAL FORMALISM
involving two brothers who suffered economic harm because of
their support of the carpenters' strike, the appellate court's deci-
sion contained a similarly confused discussion of the primary pur-
pose of the defendants' actions. Chief Justice Thompson, writing
for the supreme court, suggested a wholly different mode of attack,
attempting to combine a rights analysis like those discussed
above6 3 with a directness test. Chief Justice Thompson stated:
The apparent confusion that exists in the law as declared in adju-
dicated cases in the different jurisdictions is due largely to a
faulty mode of approach. Whenever a court permits itself to be
led afield into a discussion of the rights of the defendant in tort
actions and to become entangled in the subtleties connected with
the phrases "primary purpose" and "legal justification," it is apt
to have its attention diverted from a consideration of the question
whether plaintiff's rights have been invaded by the doing of the
act charged.2"
Despite his lofty rhetoric, Chief Justice Thompson further wrote
that "[n]o persons . . have the right to directly or indirectly in-
terfere with or disturb another in his lawful business or occupation
or for the sake of compelling him to do some act which in his own
judgment his own interest does not require. "265 This assertion is
legally unsound. Strikes had been legal in Illinois for decades266
and each legal strike is an interference with or disturbance of an-
other to compel him to do some act which in his own judgment his
own interest did not require. The real ground for the decision was
that this defendant did not benefit directly from harming this
plaintiff. Thus, while Chief Justice Thompson appeared to reject
the primary purpose analysis and the direct-indirect distinction,
his decision rested on exactly that analysis and that distinction.8 7
253 For a discussion of the Carlson court's treatment of the parties' rights, see supra
text accompanying notes 190.92.
2- 305 M11. at 336, 137 N.E. at 224.
:6 Id. at 338, 137 N.E. at 224.
2" See, e.g., Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Il1. 213, 225-26, 99 N.E. 389, 394 (1912)
(dictum) (strikes are permitted when main objectives are to benefit the interests of the or-
ganization and to improve the position of its membership); Wilson v. Hey, 232 11. 389, 396,
83 N.E. 928, 929 (1908) (dictum) (labor union has right to boycott an employer). See gener-
ally C. GREGORY, supra note 19, at 52-82 (discussion of judicial holdings on legality of
strikes in New York and Massachusetts).
" While Chief Justice Thompson seemed to focus his argument on the issue of the
superiority of the plaintiffs' rights to those of the defendant, a closer examination reveals
that the Carlson rationale emphasized the indirectness of the business relationships existing
among the opposing parties. The court stated that John Carlson, the union carpenter, had
19831
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Chief Justice Thompson's decision was, in fact, the first Illinois ap-
plication of the directness test to refute a plaintiff's argument that
the defendant benefited directly from the plaintiff's injury, without
confusing the question with assertions of malice.
In Brims v. People,sss the court held that a strike against an
employer because he was using trim manufactured by a non-union
company violated an injunction against "threatening, coercing or
intimidating" any person dealing with the company, reasoning
once again that the primary purpose of the strike was injurious
because its value to the union was only indirect.2 9 The court
quoted language written by Chief Justice Taft of the United States
Supreme Court when he was a Federal district court judge regard-
ing a strike somewhat similar to that at issue in Brims:
The one combination [a strike] . . . was lawful, because it
was for the lawful purpose of selling the labor of those engaged in
it for the highest price obtainable, and on the best terms....
But the employ6s of defendant companies are not dissatisfied
with the terms of their employment. So far as appears, those
terms work a mutual benefit to [the] employer and [the]
employed.2 7 0
In Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee to Enforce the
Landis Award,7 1 the last and most complicated of the cases aris-
ing out of the carpenters' strike, the lower court introduced yet
another interpretation of the distinction between "direct" and "in-
direct" actions.7 2 In addressing the question of which of the de-
no express contractual obligation to the defendant that would justify interference by the
Contractors' Association with Carlson's ability to procure outside employment. Carlson v.
Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n, 305 Ill. 331, 337, 137 N.E. 222, 224 (1922). Chief Justice
Thompson also noted that Oscar Carlson, the independent builder, was denied access to
building materials simply because he continued to employ union members, a denial which
exceeded the legal perimeters established for permissible lockouts. Id.
26 226 Ill. App. 505, aff'd sub nom. Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' Dist.
Council, 308 Ill. 488, 139 N.E. 887 (1923).
269 Id. at 520.
210 Id. at 518 (quoting Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730, 738
(N.D. Ohio 1893)).
171 244 Ill. App. 540, rev'd, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N.E. 393 (1928).
I'l 244 M11. App. at 540. The massive building trades strike which had given rise to the
earlier cases was settled by an arbitration award by Judge Kenesaw Landis. However, sev-
eral unions, including the carpenters' union, had not agreed to be bound by the award, and
rejected it when it was finally made. Id. at 549. In response, the contractors organized to
enforce the award, and in 1921, an organization of local businessmen not directly connected
with the building trades was formed to support the contractors-the Citizens' Committee.
Id. at 550. One of the Committee's practices that gave rise to this suit was the pressuring of
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fendant Citizens' Committee's actions were per se enjoinable, the
lower court wrote:
We are of the opinion that when the defendants attempted to
extend their influence to the bankers of the city, and thereby cut
off the supply of money ... they were attempting to injure the
carpenters, . . . by making a "raid in the rear." The making of
the building loans had nothing directly to do with either the
amount of work to be done or the supply of labor to do it. It had
nothing to do with any of the questions in controversy between
the union employers and the organized employers and could have
no legitimate effect upon the competition which existed between
those two groups over such questions. It, therefore, tended, with-
out legal justification, to interfere with the freedom to which both
owners and independent contractors were entitled, in negotiating
for the loan of money.173
This opinion implies that anyone could do anything that "oper-
ate[s] directly and immediately on the subject matter of. . . con-
troversy." The defendants in Citizens' Committee were not the
employing contractors, nor were some of them involved in the
building trades at all.2 74 These defendants clearly were not in-
volved in a "trade dispute" with plaintiffs, nor were they in a posi-
tion to benefit directly and immediately from their coercive ac-
tions. The court's conclusion as to what kinds of actions might be
enjoined, however, completely ignored the status of these defen-
dants, and appears to hold that only those actions that directly
harm the plaintiff are unlawful.7 5 Of course, had such logic ever
been applied to similar union action in other cases, almost every-
thing done by the unions would have been deemed legal. 276
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court dealt summa-
rily with the distinction that the lower court drew between the dif-
banks to refuse or withdraw mortgages on any property worked on by union carpenters. Id.
at 550. The lower court held that the Committee's activities concerning mortgages were en-
joinable, but that the union did not come to the court with clean hands. The court therefore
refused to issue an injunction. Id. at 591.
273 Id. at 570-71.
274 Id. at 549. The Citizens' Committee was comprised of representatives from various
organizations, including the Chicago Association of Commerce, the Illinois Manufacturers'
Association, the Western Society of Engineers, the local chapter of the American Institute of
Architects, the Chicago Real Estate Board, the banks of the city, and other business groups.
Id. at 549-50.
275 Id. at 602-04.
276 Striking and picketing to attain closed shops directly harm employers and, hence,
under a "direct harm to the plaintiff" test, necessarily would be declared illegal.
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ferent types of actions undertaken by the Citizens' Committee.
The supreme court focused its attention on the Citizens' Commit-
tee's role in the dispute, rejecting the lower court's novel theory
that any direct harm is justified, stating:
Competition ... does not include all conflicts of temporal inter-
est, and does not apply in the case of the efforts of a stranger to a
controversy between employers and employees, in regard to their
business relations, to compel the action of either or to injure ei-
ther for the purpose of compelling him to yield to the other the
absolute legal right to manage his own business in his own way. 78
The primary purpose test in Illinois was never given the clear
factual basis and policy justification that the directness test was
given in Massachusetts. 27 ' Further, while the Massachusetts test
was only occasionally confused by combining it with an analysis of
the defendant's motives, that confusion was common in Illinois.'"
Nonetheless, malice and primary purpose analysis were intended
to address different things2 8  The primary purpose test was, in
fact, much the same as the directness test: if the primary purpose
of the defendant's acts was to achieve "lawful benefits," then the
action was lawful; if it was to achieve ends which would only re-
motely contribute to attainment of lawful benefits, then it was
"malicious" and unlawful. The additional step introduced by the
primary purpose language, declaring the defendant's motives to be
pure or impure, added no substance to the analysis or conclusion.
Hence, the analysis suffered exactly those problems discussed
above in connection with the directness test.29 2
277 333 Ill. at 244, 164 N.E. at 400.
-8 Id. at 246, 164 N.E. at 400-01.
279 Compare Carlson v. Carpenter Contractors' Ass'n, 305 il. 331, 336, 137 N.E. 222,
224 (1922) (primary purpose concept interferes with court's consideration of plaintiff's
rights) with Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 359, 74 N.E. 603, 605 (1905) (strike to obtain
direct benefits of improved working conditions is valid).
280 See, e.g., Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 I1. 213, 219, 99 N.E. 389, 392 (1912) (em-
ployee has right to protection from malicious interference caused by another employee, un-
less interference is consequence of exercise of some legal right); Brims v. People, 226 IIl.
App. 505, 522-23 (1922) (people have right to organize for their own benefit, but not to
injure others), aff'd sub nom. Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council, 308
Ill. 488, 139 N.E. 887 (1923).
281 The malice test focuses on the intent of the actor to injure another, see, e.g.,
Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 Ill. 608, 615, 52 N.E. 924, 926 (1898), whereas the primary pur-
pose doctrine focuses on the motives of the actor, see, e.g., Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers'
Int'l Union, 358 Ill. 239, 247-49, 193 N.E. 112, 116-17 (1934).
282 See supra notes 216-36 and accompanying text.
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The Anti-Injunction Act in Illinois
Like Massachusetts, Illinois passed an anti-injunction act (the
Illinois Act).2 ss In the early cases interpreting the Illinois Act, the
Illinois court was more prepared than its Massachusetts counter-
part to view the legislation as having changed the common-law
rules. Ultimately, however, the court went beyond the Massachu-
setts court in reviving old rules to emasculate the Illinois Act.
Initially, although the theme of direct and indirect benefits
appeared in the Illinois cases, it was not nearly as dominant as it
was in the Massachusetts discussion of "trade disputes." In the
first major case interpreting the Illinois Act, Fenske Brothers v.
Upholsterers' International Union, 4 the court looked to the
Kemp decision, in which the generally conservative Illinois court of
the 1910's recognized a legal interest of a union in strengthening
its own organization, for an understanding of the meaning of "re-
mote" benefits.285 Referring to Kemp, the Fenske court interpreted
the direct-indirect distinction as being solely between malicious
and economically motivated acts.28 6 Indeed, the court not only
stated that acts "to further the interests of the organization ' 21 are
legally justified, but also argued that every case in which union
actions were enjoined involved either malevolence or violence on
the part of the union.2 8 The court analyzed the cases that on their
face outlawed peaceable picketing, "explained" that each really
enjoined "combinations ... which have for their immediate pur-
pose the injury of another, ' 2 9 and concluded that peaceful picket-
2 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (Smith-Hurd 1969). The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act of
1925, commonly referred to as the Anti-Injunction Law, was designed to make lawful certain
acts enumerated in the statute, such as strikes and peaceful picketing prompted by a dis-
pute concerning terms or conditions of employment. Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Int'l
Union, 358 IMI. 239, 246, 193 N.E. 112, 115 (1934). Unlike the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Illinois Act neither specifically delineates actions not subject to restraining orders or injunc-
tions nor defines disputes concerning terms and conditions of employment. Id.
284 358 IlM. 239, 193 N.E. 112 (1934). In Fenske, several locals of the Upholsterers' Inter-
national Union of North America picketed 12 furniture manufacturers in response to the
manufacturers' refusal to accede to the union's demand that the manufacturers operate
closed shops. Id. at 243, 193 N.E. at 114. The manufacturers sought to enjoin the union's
actions and to have the Illinois Act declared unconstitutional. Id.
288 Id. at 247, 193 N.E. at 116 (citing Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Il. 213, 99 N.E.
389 (1912)).
28" Fenske, 35811. at 247, 193 N.E. at 116. For an analysis of the supreme court's use of
the direct-indirect test in Kemp, see supra notes 251-61 and accompanying text.
:87 358 Ill. at 249, 193 N.E. at 116.
-88 Id. at 249-50, 193 N.E. at 117.
289 Id. at 248, 193 N.E. at 116.
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ing had never been unlawful per se in Illinois.2 90 Moreover, the
court observed that the governance of labor conflict was best left to
the legislature, which had spoken clearly on the subject of picket-
ing, and that "[i]nasmuch as the Legislature had a right to legalize
acts of peaceable picketing and peaceable persuasion," it necessa-
rily followed that the Act was constitutional.291
Three years later, in Schuster v. International Association of
Machinists,292 the Appellate Court of Illinois considered the ques-
tion of the existence of a trade dispute2e--the same point that the
Massachusetts court was entertaining at that time. In Schuster,
the plaintiff employer maintained that picketing is legal only when
a labor dispute exists within the meaning of the Illinois Act, and
that the defendant union's attempt to organize the plaintiff's open
shop did not constitute a labor dispute.2 4 The court held for the
defendant union on two grounds. First, the court pointed out that
the federal anti-injunction act included attempts to organize open
shops among the actions that could not be enjoined in federal
courts, adding that "no sound reason is advanced why the public
policy of this state as to the matter under consideration should not
be in accord with the public policy of the federal government
.... ,"25 Second, the court indulged in a more lengthy and impas-
sioned free speech argument, which, without ever mentioning the
rather dry and technical concepts of direct or remote benefits, ap-
pears in fact to have been partly directed to the substantive mean-
ing of that distinction as applied to unions:
[The plaintiff] persists in his refusal to deal with a labor union
and yet he resents as an infringement of his rights the disclosure
by that union to the public ... of his antagonism to organized
:90 Id. at 249, 193 N.E. at 117.
91 Id. at 257, 193 N.E. at 120.
2" 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N.E.2d 50 (1937).
203 Id. at 182, 12 N.E.2d at 52.
2"Id. at 183, 12 N.E.2d at 52. The defendant's representatives unsuccessfully at-
tempted to solicit the employee automobile mechanics to join the union. Id. at 179, 12
N.E.2d at 51. Union members began picketing the shop during business hours in an effort to
force the plaintiff to close his shop by inducing his employees to join the union or by dis-
charging those who refused. Id. The plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction restraining
the defendants from picketing and from publicly espousing their opinion that the plaintiff
was unfair to organized labor. Id. at 181, 12 N.E.2d at 51-52. At trial, the plaintiff main-
tained that the picketing was not within the ambit of protection afforded by the Illinois Act
because it did not concern terms or conditions of employment within the parameters of an
employee-employer relationship. Id. at 181, 12 N.E.2d at 52.
295 Id. at 184, 12 N.E.2d at 53.
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labor. His position that, notwithstanding his antagonism to the
union, the law must silence the voice of organized labor lest he
may suffer any ill consequences as a result of his attitude, is un-
tenable.... What inalienable right has an employer who is un-
fair in the eyes of organized labor to the favor of the continued
patronage of its members and friends?26
In Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union,97 however, the supreme court approached the Illinois Act
in much the same way as the Massachusetts court interpreted the
Massachusetts Act. The case involved a boycott and a picket line
established by the defendant union against the plaintiff, a non-
union company.29
s
The court recognized the employer's common-law right to do
business without unauthorized interference, and then observed:
The foundation of the action is not necessarily the intent to in-
jure .... The controlling feature is the malice which accompa-
nies the intent to injure, which is manifested by the doing of an
unlawful act, and for such purpose the injuring of the person in
the enjoyment of his right to do business or to have employment
is the unlawful act which, coupled with acts accompanying it, cre-
ate the cause of action.299
The court acknowledged that, as between employer and employee,
"there has been a modification, and, in many instances, a complete
2" Id. at 193-94, 12 N.E.2d at 56-57. The majority also noted the futility of organizing
labor if such organizations are precluded from expanding their membership absent the em-
ployees' manifest intent to organize. Id. at 199, 12 N.E.2d at 59. Hence, if first amendment
freedoms are to be protected, the court reasoned, it is essential that unions be permitted to
"use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)).
In addition, the court recognized the competing rights and privileges of the litigants.
293 I1. App. at 199, 12 N.E.2d at 59. The majority opined, however, that because the plain-
tiff's right/privilege to operate a non-union shop is not absolute, the union must also be
allowed to exercise its competing right/privilege to publicize its consequent regard for him
as unfair. Id.
2:7 371 M. 377, 21 N.E.2d 308 (1939), aff'd, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
,"Id. at 379-80, 21 N.E.2d at 310. The plaintiff dairy company employed non-union
labor and operated under a different system of delivery than the union vendors. Id. Conse-
quently, the non-union vendors were able to sell their product at lower prices than union
vendors, thereby causing economic injury through lost employment to the latter. Id. When
the union began peacefully picketing the stores that purchased the non-union delivered milk
in response to the dairy's refusal to unionize, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a permanent
injunction against picketing. Id. at 396, 21 N.E.2d at 317.
" Id. at 382, 21 N.E.2d at 311.
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change in the rule of the common law." ' The court quoted lan-
guage from Fenske, however, stating that combinations for the im-
mediate purpose of injuring another were illegal and defined the
union's actions as such a combination.301 Finally, the court
concluded:
It is the specified acts in a labor dispute between parties, that
come within the act, and the act does not purport to prevent per-
sons or corporations not parties to a labor dispute from protecting
their business or property by injunction. The act does not pro-
hibit injunctions in all matters which affect employment, but only
in labor disputes which affect employment. A careful reading of
the act discloses it was intended to apply in cases where employ-
ees have a dispute with their own employer relative to terms and
conditions of employment, or where similar questions are in-
volved in a labor dispute between several groups of employees
and employers.30 2
The direct-indirect distinction, which the Fenske case had
seemed to abolish, was revived in the Meadowmoor treatment of
"labor disputes," and once again tied to the malice standard.303
The substance of the standard had changed somewhat. Fenske, by
adopting the Kemp rule that a strike for a closed shop by the em-
ployees of a plaintiff-employer was "direct" as "the common law"
standard, had modified it.30 4 The form of the distinction, however,
3- Id. at 382-83, 21 N.E.2d at 312. Prior to the passage of the Illinois Act, even peaceful
picketing of an employer by employees concerning the terms and conditions of employment
was unlawful. See Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 293 Ill. App. 177, 182, 12
N.E.2d 50, 52 (1937). Subsequent to the enactment of the statute, however, decisions that
denied statutory protection to questionable labor disputes acknowledged the absolute pro-
tection from injunctive interference enjoyed by lawful employer-employee controversies.
See, e.g., 2063 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 305 Ill. App. 486, 486, 27 N.E.2d 478,
479 (1940) (absent employer-employee relationship between disputants, statutorily unpro-
tected secondary boycott is established by picketing activities), aff'd in part, 377 Ml. 37, 35
N.E.2d 373 (1941); Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 301 Ill. App. 607,
607, 22 N.E.2d 962, 963 (1939) (affirming injunction of picketing activities on the ground
that there was no dispute between plaintiff corporation and employees).
301 371 Ill. at 383, 21 N.E.2d at 312.
302 Id. at 384, 21 N.E.2d at 312.
303 Id. at 382, 21 N.E.2d at 313-14.
I" In Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N.E.2d 349 (1941), the
Illinois Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court, in affirming
Meadowmoor, and in reversing Swing v. American Fed'n of Labor, 372 Ill. 91, 22 N.E.2d 857
(1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 659 (1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), conclusively established
peaceful picketing as a lawful means by which to induce a non-union employer to "close" or
"open" shop. Ellingsen, 377 Ill. at 81-82, 35 N.E.2d at 354. According to the opinion of the
majority, this is also true in the absence of an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 82, 35
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remained essentially unchanged. A dispute between a union and a
non-union employer was, by definition, not a labor dispute; a pick-
et line or boycott established other than in the course of a labor
dispute was, by definition, indirect; a strike or boycott for indirect
benefits was malicious. Thus, since the legislature could not have
intended to legitimate malicious acts, it did not intend to legiti-
mate strikes or boycotts by a union against one not a union
employer.305
At least as late as 1947, the terms of the Illinois Act discussion
remained the same, and the substantive content of the direct-indi-
rect distinction was still confused in Illinois. The following quota-
tion, taken from Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters & Chauffeurs Local Union No. 79,06 ilustrates the court's
continuing uncertainty as to the significance of the distinction
upon which it still relied:
It has been repeatedly held that it is an actionable wrong to
directly or indirectly interfere with or disturb another in his busi-
ness without lawful cause or justification for the sake of compel-
ling him to do some act which in his own judgment his own inter-
est does not require.307
N.E.2d at 352.
305 371 ]11. at 385-86, 21 N.E.2d at 313-14.
3 331 I App. 129, 72 N.E.2d 635 (1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 815 (1948). In Dinof-
fria, union representatives sought to compel the plaintiffs, who were self-employed owners
and operators of an Illinois service station, to join the Teamsters Union and to comply with
the union's operating procedures. Id. at 131-32, 72 N.E.2d at 636. When the plaintiffs re-
fused, union supervisors instructed other union members to stop making deliveries and, as a
result, the station ran out of fuel. Id. at 133, 72 N.E.2d at 637.
The court determined that although workers may combine for the primary purpose of
furthering the interests of a labor organization, under the circumstances, the union could
not obtain such a benefit by compelling plaintiffs, who had hired no employees, to become
union members. Id. at 135, 72 N.E.2d at 638.
807 Id. at 142, 72 N.E.2d at 641. Despite the apparent abolition of the direct-indirect
distinction in Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union, 358 IM. 239, 259-60, 193 N.E. 112,
120 (1934), subsequent cases continued to rely on it to varying degrees and in varying cir-
cumstances, see, e.g., Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors Union, Local No. 1, 315 Ill. App.
328, 344, 43 N.E.2d 198, 205 (1942) (union not enjoined from interfering with operation of
building in which owner acted as janitor when purpose of activity is to influence other union
members and the public), appeal dismissed, 328 11. 124, 46 N.E.2d 27 (1943); see 2063
Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 40, 35 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1941) (secon-
dary boycott is an "indirect illegal boycott"); see also Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union, 313 Ill. App. 24, 26, 38 N.E.2d 972, 973 (1942) (although secondary boycott
is not illegal, under certain circumstances, it may be enjoined).
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CONCLUSION
This Article is intended largely as an exercise in descrip-
tion-it tells what happened, and only to a lesser extent hypothe-
sizes why. Certain conclusions, however, are unavoidable from the
simple study of the "what." Formal legal logic generally is consid-
ered in modern law schools to be a faintly obscure historical move-
ment, belonging to the near-infancy of American jurisprudence. If
it is considered at all outside the halls of legal history classes, it is
considered as a somewhat quaint forerunner to better-reasoned
and more reasonable modern legal decisions. Yet the paradigm of
formalism-the conception of legal disputes as involving simple
conflicts of rights that can be resolved by a proper understanding
of those rights, and the application of mechanical rules of logic to
these properly understood rights-has never been fully abandoned,
and even the most patently inadequate constructs of formalism
have a disturbing way of popping up in modern, post-Realist law
as fundamental principles. Stripped of their outmoded justifica-
tions, these principles appear to modern legal practitioners as fore-
gone conclusions: the basic axioms upon which legal argument
rests. Yet a careful study of the history and development of such
"fundamental axioms" must lead us to ask whether there is any
reason, other than tradition, for accepting them as valid, and to
wonder whether there might not be some other alternative ways of
looking at legal questions. The simple study of history cannot, of
itself, answer the question of what alternatives exist, but it must
force us at least to ask that question.
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